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Abstract
Motivated by the failure of fi scal rules to eliminate defi cit bias in the euro area, this paper 
analyzes an alternative policy regime in which each Member State government delegates at 
least one fi scal instrument to an independent authority with a mandate to avoid excessive 
debt. Other fi scal decisions remain in the hands of member governments, including the 
allocation of spending across different public goods, and the composition of taxation. We 
study the short-and long-run properties of dynamic games representing different institutional 
confi gurations in a monetary union. Delegation of budget balance responsibilities to a 
national or union-wide fi scal authority implies large long-run welfare gains due to much 
lower steady-state debt. The presence of the fi scal authority also reduces the welfare cost 
of fl uctuations in the demand for public spending, in spite of the fact that the authority 
imposes considerable “austerity” when it responds to fi scal shocks.
Keywords: independent fi scal authority, delegation, decentralization, monetary union, 
sovereign debt.
JEL classifi cation: E61, E62, F41, H63.
Resumen
Motivado por la persistencia de los défi cits públicos en muchos países de la UME, 
en contra de los compromisos de sus propias reglas fi scales, este papel estudia un 
régimen fi scal alternativo, según el cual cada país miembro delegaría el control de algún 
instrumento fi scal a una autoridad independiente que tendría la responsabilidad de evitar 
la acumulación de una deuda excesiva. Otras decisiones fi scales, como por ejemplo la 
composición del gasto público y la estructura de la imposición, quedarían bajo el control 
de los gobiernos de los estados miembros. Estudiamos el comportamiento a corto y a 
largo plazo del equilibrio de unos juegos dinámicos que sirven como modelos de posibles 
confi guraciones institucionales para la unión monetaria. Delegar la responsabilidad de 
mantener la sostenibilidad fi scal produce ganancias importantes de bienestar, al disminuir 
notablemente la deuda de largo plazo. Además, reduce el coste de las fl uctuaciones en 
la demanda de gasto público, a pesar de la «austeridad» con la que la autoridad fi scal 
responde a las perturbaciones fi scales.
Palabras clave: autoridad fi scal independiente, delegación de instrumentos, descentralización, 
unión monetaria, deuda soberana.
Códigos JEL: E61, E62, F41, H63.
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1 Introduction
The legacy of high debt in the aftermath of recent global financial crises leaves policy
makers searching for stronger frameworks to ensure fiscal sustainability, especially in
Europe. In this context, many countries have now established agencies independent
of government with a mandate to monitor fiscal trends and to assess compliance with
fiscal rules. In this paper, we study the effects of a more ambitious form of fiscal
delegation, in which an independent authority is given direct control of one or more
fiscal instruments, with a mandate to ensure long-run budget balance.
That is, we study a regime in which member state governments maintain control
of almost all their fiscal decisions, except for a single instrument, which would instead
be set by an outside agency, independent of the government, with the goal of avoiding
excessive debt accumulation. While this type of fiscal delegation might benefit any
country that suffers from deficit bias, at the present time it may be more politically
realistic in Europe, where core countries worry about ballooning peripheral debt, while
peripheral countries fret about their inability to protect themselves unilaterally against
financial panics and speculative attacks. These concerns highlight the possibility of a
mutually beneficial accord, in which institutions to prevent the propagation of sovereign
and banking risks are made available to any peripheral countries that delegate control
of at least one powerful fiscal instrument to an agency of the European Union, such as
the new European Fiscal Board.1 Compared with existing fiscal rules and the intrusive
monitoring that comes with activation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, delegating a
fiscal instrument to Brussels could both prove to be a more credible guarantee of fiscal
sustainability from creditors’ point of view, and simultaneously, a less burdensome
constraint on national fiscal sovereignty from debtors’ point of view.
In previous work (Basso and Costain, 2016) we studied how delegation of fiscal
instruments to an independent authority affects long-run, steady-state debt accumula-
tion in a monetary union. We identified several distinct mechanisms through which an
independent fiscal authority would tend to restrain debt growth: first, the debt aver-
sion induced by its mandate; second, its greater patience, compared with the elected
government; and third, the internalization of free-riding problems associated with de-
centralized fiscal choices in a monetary union. We extend this analysis in two crucial
dimensions. First, we investigate whether correcting long-term debt biases hinders the
cyclical stabilization of fluctuations in the demand for public spending. Second, we
relax the (probably unrealistic) assumption that an independent fiscal authority could
1For a description of the European Fiscal Board, see European Commission (19 October 2016).
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control debt issuance directly, and instead consider dynamic games where the control
variables are public spending and taxes, while debt is determined as a residual.
We carry out our analysis in a reduced-form macroeconomic model in which output
is decreased by taxes and increased by surprise inflation, under the assumption that
society values low inflation, high output, and high public spending. We study how
the equilibrium of the dynamic policy game differs depending on which instruments
are controlled by each of the institutions considered (member state governments, the
central bank of the monetary union, and independent fiscal authorities either at the
national or union-wide level). All policy-making institutions are assumed to be benev-
olent planners, but (as in Rogoff, 1985) we assume that their different mandates lead
them to weight the components of social welfare differently. In particular, we make
two mild assumptions about institutional preferences: (1) elected institutions are more
impatient than nonelected ones, and (2) an institution mandated to achieve a simple,
feasible, quantitative goal will value that goal more strongly than the rest of soci-
ety does. Since institutions differ in their preferences, the irrelevance of instrument
assignment found by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) does not apply.
Building on a simple macroeconomic model and a simple approach to institutional
preferences has two big advantages. First, it allows us to solve our dynamic game in
a fully nonlinear way, computing the economic dynamics and welfare implications in
steady state and along transition paths and in response to stochastic shocks. In our
numerical simulations, delegation to a fiscal authority implies a large decrease in steady-
state debt, inflation, and tax burdens, and raises social welfare almost to the level
achieved by a committed social planner. On the other hand, one might conjecture that
these long-run gains from fiscal discipline come at the cost of less effective stabilization
policy. However, this is not true: we find instead that establishing a fiscal authority
reduces the welfare cost of fluctuations in the demand for public spending, in spite
of the fact that the authority imposes considerable “austerity” when it responds to
fiscal shocks. We evaluate the cost of fluctuations both from an ex ante perspective
(expected losses due to future variance around the mean path), and also from an ex
post perspective (the welfare loss due to suffering a large negative shock to the fiscal
balance). From either perspective, the welfare cost of fluctuations is smaller in an
economy with a fiscal authority than it is in the status quo monetary union.
A second advantage of our simple setup is that we can focus on the details of the
policy game, in terms of instrument assignment and the timing of moves. Each policy
maker in our framework acts as a discretionary Ramsey planner, and in equilibrium
each planner must anticipate how its own control variables impact debt and thereby
affect the future choices of the other planners. A crucial observation is that the Euler
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equation(s) determining debt dynamics reflects the impatience of the policy maker(s)
that actually chooses debt. So when we assume that the government or the fiscal
authority controls the debt, that agent’s discount factor enters the formula for the long-
run deficit level. But under the more realistic assumption that the government chooses
public spending, the fiscal authority chooses taxes, and the central bank chooses the
inflation rate, all three of these instruments determine debt jointly, and three Euler
equations reflecting three different discount factors all play a role in the dynamics.
Inflation bias becomes more severe in this case, and the fiscal authority becomes less
effective at controlling debt. Nonetheless, our main conclusions about the advantages
of fiscal delegation remain unchanged.
In the remainder of this section, we briefly review the related literature. We then
define the economic environment of our model. In Section 3, we define a series of
policy games representing different institutional configurations; we compute equilibria
of these games and discuss their long-run and short-run implications for debt, inflation,
and social welfare. Section 4 discusses how fiscal delegation might be implemented, in
practice, in the European context. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
Economists from Mundell (1961) to Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) and Farhi and
Werning (2015) have emphasized the fiscal challenges implied by losing the freedom to
set monetary policy independently as a consequence of joining a monetary union. The
literature on monetary and fiscal interactions (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 2013) also points to
the fragility of monetary unions: the set of monetary and fiscal rules consistent with
solvency and equilibrium determinacy is likely to be reduced by joining a monetary
union (Bergin, 1998; Sims, 1999; Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2011). Yet another factor
that may increase the fiscal vulnerability of monetary unions is deficit bias. Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b) constructed an example in which joining a monetary union has
no effect on policy outcomes if all policy makers have identical objective functions.
But when policy makers’ preferences differ in plausible ways, for instance due to the
effects of electoral politics (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Battaglini, 2011), then joining
a monetary union can increase deficit bias, as multiple authors have shown (Beetsma
and Bovenberg, 1999; Buti, Roeger, and In’t Veld, 2001; Beetsma and Jensen, 2005;
Chari and Kehoe, 2007).
Following the logic of Rogoff (1985), policy delegation may be an effective solu-
tion for the biases that arise when excessively impatient policy makers face incentives
to break past promises. This insight is potentially applicable to deficit bias, as well
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as inflation bias. Hence, over recent decades, as monetary policy delegation to inde-
pendent central banks has become the norm, many economists have also advocated
delegating some fiscal responsibilities to institutions independent of government. The
literature distinguishes fiscal councils— which monitor but do not implement fiscal
policy actions— from independent fiscal authorities (IFAs), which would actually con-
trol some of the fiscal decisions that are currently in the hands of government.2 Fiscal
councils are by now common, and are mandated under the recent European “Fiscal
Compact” treaty (European Council, 2012), but IFAs remain hypothetical.
Two main classes of IFA have been proposed. On one hand, the IFA might set a
deficit target, at the start of the annual budget cycle, which the government is (some-
how) bound to respect; proposals of this type include von Hagen and Harden (1995);
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen (1999); and Wyplosz (2005). Alternatively,
an IFA might exercise executive control over some fiscal instrument with a strong bud-
getary impact; proposals include Ball (1997); Gruen (1997); Seidman and Lewis (2002);
Wren-Lewis (2002); and Costain and de Blas (2012a). These numerous practical pro-
posals contrast with the dearth of theoretical work to model the effects of fiscal policy
delegation. Some authors take the nonexistence of IFAs today as evidence that fiscal
delegation is not feasible, because fiscal decisions are multidimensional, complex, and
inherently political due to their redistributive implications.3 But this argument does
not apply to the fiscal framework considered in our model, for several reasons. First,
we assume that only one instrument (or a small subset of instruments) is delegated.
Second, we consider instruments with an across-the-board budget impact; concretely,
we compare delegation of debt issuance to delegating control of the overall level of
taxes. Third, we assume the mandate of the IFA reflects a largely quantitative goal,
such as maintaining long-run solvency, thus minimizing distributional issues.4
Even if fiscal delegation proves effective for reducing deficit bias, it is also important
to ask how it affects the stabilization of shocks, which may require countercyclical
policies and accommodative changes in debt levels. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2011)
look at monetary and fiscal interactions when sovereign debt is present. They find
that stabilization of fiscal shocks is heavily influenced by the effect of inflation on
the competitiveness of each union member, requiring optimal policy from a country
2See Debrun, Hauner, and Kumar (2009); Hagemann (2010); and Costain and de Blas (2012a) for
surveys of fiscal policy delegation.
3See Hagemann (2010), Sec. II.C; or Calmfors (2011), Sec. 1.
4From a political economy perspective, Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Eggertsson and Borgne (2010),
and Maskin (September 29, 2016) discuss the reasons why a democratic society may prefer to delegate
certain types of decisions from politicians to unelected technocrats.
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perspective to change debt gradually. Our reduced form model does not have variations
of terms of trade, which could amplify the shortcomings of fiscal delegation in providing
adequate stabilization. However, as opposed to the framework there, we solve for both
the dynamics and the steady state under discretion and find that the debt biases under
a monetary union are strong such that any gains of using debt issuance during the
transition is offset such that welfare is higher under fiscal delegation. Gnocchi and
Lambertini (2016) also focus on public debt under a distortionary steady state, but
as opposed to us they always retain monetary policy commitment. Leeper, Leith, and
Liu (2016) also stress the importance of non-linear effects incorporated in models of
monetary-fiscal policy interaction solved using global methods. They find that in a
single country model, lack of commitment generates debt stabilization bias, as is the
case in our model. Interestingly, they find that for high levels of debt, monetary policy
is used more heavily; inflation and lower rates are used to reduce debt.
In contrast to the framework we study here, many high-profile calls for Euro-
pean institutional reforms have assumed that achieving adequate protection against
speculative attacks and banking crises makes full political integration inevitable (see
De Grauwe, 2012; Soros, 10 April 2013; or Pisani-Ferry, 2012). We agree that getting
fiscal policy right is crucial for strengthening monetary policy, but we argue that the
necessary reforms are more limited than is commonly supposed. What is essential is
that European authorities must be able to ensure long-run national budget balance,
and for this they must control at least one fiscal instrument of sufficient power in each
member state. In accord with the principle of subsidiarity, all other fiscal decisions
can remain at the national level. Sims (September 20, 2012) likewise stresses that fis-
cal discipline requires European control over some powerful budget instrument in each
member state, arguing that further fiscal integration is neither necessary nor politically
plausible. Similarly, some limited European tax powers form an essential backstop for
banking union, as envisioned by Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) or Obstfeld (2013), but
further fiscal integration is not required under these proposals.
2 The economic environment
Our setup extends the reduced-form framework of Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) and
Basso and Costain (2016). It is not our goal to explain the imperfections in public
institutions’ decisions, such as excessive impatience or deficit bias, which have been
discussed extensively in the political economy literature. Instead, we aim to model
these features parsimoniously in order to study how equilibrium outcomes differ across
games in which policy variables are controlled by different sets of institutions. In
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particular, we investigate how systematic policy biases are damped or enhanced by
different institutional configurations, for a typical country in a monetary union. To
address the effects on a typical country (and to simplify the math), we assume all
countries are symmetric.5
Time is discrete. Several regions j ∈ {1, 2, ...J} each benefit from local public
spending, and face region-specific budget constraints. These regions might be consid-
ered nations, or subnational areas. Together, they form a monetary union, in which a
single inflation rate applies.
2.1 Social welfare and budget constraints
Let time t private-sector output in country j be xj,t. Our main macroeconomic
assumptions are that inflation πt stimulates output when it is unexpectedly high
(πt > π
e
t ≡ Et−1πt), and that distorting taxes τj,t decrease output relative to its “nat-
ural” level x. That is,
xj,t = x+ ν(πt − πet − τj,t). (1)
Social welfare decreases quadratically as output, inflation, and government services
gj,t deviate from their bliss points. The bliss point for inflation is assumed to be zero,
and that for output is a constant x˜ > 0. The bliss point for public spending, g˜j,t, varies
stochastically over time:6
g˜j,t = g˜ + sj,t, (2)
sj,t = ρsj,t−1 + j,t, (3)
where g˜ > 0 is a constant and j,t is normal i.i.d. shock with mean zero and variance
σ2. The loss function for region j is7
LSj = E0
T∑
t=0
βtS
{
απSπ
2
t + (xj,t − x˜)2 + αgS (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
}
. (4)
The weights απS > 0 and αgS > 0 represent the relative importance of deviations
of inflation and public services from their bliss points; without loss of generality the
weight on output deviations is one. The discount factor for social welfare is βS < 1.
5Small asymmetries between countries leave our results qualitatively unchanged; see footnote 15.
6The bliss points x˜ and g˜j,t should be interpreted as extremely high levels of private and public
consumption that are unlikely to be budget-feasible.
7Alesina and Tabellini (1987) derive an output relation of the form (1) from a more complete
model. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2011) derive a social welfare function of the form (4) from a New
Keynesian framework with government spending in the utility function.
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Since we are modeling a set of independent states that lack consensus for full polit-
ical integration, we assume that policy is constrained by a distinct budget constraint
for each region. We write total government expenditure in region j at time t as qj,tgj,t,
where gj,t represents the quantity of public services, and qj,t is their price (in con-
sumption units). Region j has only two sources of revenue for its spending, both
distortionary: tax revenues τj,t, and seignorage revenues κπt (assumed to be linear in
inflation). Now, let dj,t−1 be the real debt of region j at the end of period t − 1. We
use bars to represent interregional averages; hence d¯t−1 = 1J
∑J
j=1 dj,t−1 represents real
average debt in the monetary union. We impose the following budget constraint on
region j:
dj,t =
[
R(d¯t−1) + χ(πet − πt)
]
dj,t−1 + qj,tgj,t − τj,t − κπt. (5)
Here, R(d¯t−1) represents the expected real interest rate, while R(d¯t−1) +χ(πet − πt)
is the ex post real interest rate, after inflation is realized. This formulation embodies
two key assumptions: nominal debt, and interest rate contagion. Parameter χ ∈ [0, 1]
can be interpreted as the fraction of debt that is nominal, and which therefore loses real
value in response to surprise inflation. Contagion is modeled by making the interest rate
a function of average debt in the union, d¯t−1, rather than country j’s own debt. Thus,
increased debt of region j raises the interest rate on bonds issued by all union members
(and likewise their debt affects the interest rate facing region j).8 For simplicity, we
assume a linear functional form:
R(d¯t) = 1 + r0 + δd¯t =
1
βS
+ δd¯t, (6)
which says that savers are willing to hold a “target” debt level d¯∗ ≡ 0 when the
interest rate just compensates their impatience.9 In addition to (5), debt must respect
an infinite horizon “no-Ponzi” condition, which simply means that expected interest
payments suffice to make it worthwhile for the private sector (with the appropriate
discount rate) to hold the bonds.
8Broto and Perez-Quiros (2013) present empirical evidence on interest rate contagion in Europe.
Our formulation oversimplifies contagion; in practice some countries have been “safe havens”, bene-
fitting form lower interest rates when the market began to distrust peripheral European debt. Our
interest rate specification is best seen as representing contagion across peripheral countries. Delegation
to a fiscal authority might be less relevant for a safe-haven country; but the presence of a safe-haven
country does not negate our analysis of the role of fiscal delegation for peripheral countries.
9But this is just a normalization. Assuming R(d¯t) =
1
βS
+ δ(d¯t − d¯∗), where d¯∗ is an arbitrary
target for debt, does not alter the qualitative results. So for simplicity, we set the target to zero.
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Total public services in region j, gj,t, are a constant-elasticity aggregate of a variety
of differentiated services gj,k,t:
gj,t =
(∫ 1
0
ωj,k,t (gj,k,t)
η−1
η dk
) η
η−1
. (7)
where η > 1, and ωj,k,t > 0 are i.i.d. weights on the different services k. Total gov-
ernment spending is a sum over all public goods,
∫ 1
0
gj,k,tdk. Spending is allocated to
minimize the cost of the aggregate public services provided:
qj,tgj,t ≡ min{gj,k,t}1k=0
∫ 1
0
gj,k,tdk s.t.
(∫ 1
0
ωj,k,t (gj,k,t)
η−1
η dk
) η
η−1
 gj,t. (8)
Equation (8) serves to define the price of government services, qj,t.
We consider two possible scenarios for the public spending decision. On one hand,
the fiscal policy maker may know the distribution of ωj,k,t, but not observe its realiza-
tion. Then it is optimal to allocate spending equally across all goods, so that
qj,t = qH ≡ (Eω)
η
1−η . (9)
At the opposite extreme, the policy maker may observe wj,k,t before choosing gj,k,t. It
is then optimal to spend more on the most-demanded services, according to
gj,k,t
gj,l,t
=
(
ωj,k,t
ωj,l,t
)η
. (10)
This more efficient allocation makes aggregate public services less expensive:
qj,t = qL = (Eω
η)
1
1−η < qH . (11)
3 Policy games
3.1 Policy makers’ objectives
Next, we study equilibrium outcomes in scenarios S where several policy institutions
I interact. While all policy makers are essentially benevolent, the weights in their loss
functions LI differ from (4) in accordance with two realistic principles. First, policy
makers subject to democratic election are assumed to be impatient; second, policy
makers subject to a simple, quantitative mandate are assumed to value that goal more
strongly than society at large.
Our status quo monetary union scenario supposes a central bank C that interacts
with many regional governments Gj. The central bank chooses inflation for the whole
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monetary union. It sums losses symmetrically across all J regions, with weight απC >
απS on inflation, weight αxC ≡ 1 on output, and weight αgC = αgS on public spending.
Each regional government Gj chooses some fiscal variables for region j, and its loss
function LGj only considers terms related to region j. It places weight απG = απS on
inflation, weight αxG ≡ 1 on output, and weight αgG = αgS on public spending.
Our alternative institutional scenarios will include other types of players. One envi-
ronment considered is the replacement of the regional governments by a single federal
government G that controls fiscal variables in all regions j. The federal government’s
loss function includes terms for all regions j, with the same weights as the regional
governments in the status quo scenario: απG = απS, αxG ≡ 1, and αgG = αgS.
We also study economies in which some fiscal instruments are delegated to a debt-
averse fiscal authority. This authority may be established by and for region j, in
which case we will call it Fj, and its loss function will include region j terms only.
Alternatively, it may be a union-wide institution, in which case we will call it F , and
we will assume that it sums losses across all regions. The loss coefficients of Fj and F
are απF = απS on inflation, αxF ≡ 1 on output, αgF = αgS on public spending, and
αdF > 0 on debt. Note that the fiscal authority is the only player that cares specifically
about the debt level, which does not appear in the social welfare function. We will
sometimes use the notation αdC = αdG ≡ 0 to emphasize the fact that the central bank
and the governments do not care specifically about debt.
Hence, while all policy institutions are assumed to value the same goals as society
and the planner, their different roles imply some differences in priorities, reflected in
the weighting coefficients shown in Table 1. The government is more impatient than
society, due to the short time horizons of electoral politics. Since the central bank and
the fiscal authority are insulated from political pressures, they are more patient than
the government. Moreover, since the central bank has a mandate to achieve a target
inflation rate, it dislikes inflation variability more than society does.10 Likewise, we
assume that the fiscal authority has a mandate to stabilize debt around some target
level, so it has a positive debt coefficient.
To obtain an equilibrium with intuitively reasonable properties, we impose a set of
natural restrictions on the quadratic objective functions.11
10Alesina and Tabellini (2007) discuss why society may prefer to delegate tasks with quantifiable
objectives to bureaucrats, instead of leaving them up to the democratic government.
11The role of these restrictions is discussed in depth in Basso and Costain (2016).
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Table 1: Baseline parameter assumptions∗
Society Central Government Fiscal
and planner bank authority
Discount factor βi 0 < βS < 1 βC = βS 0 < βG < βS βG < βF  βS
βSR(0) = 1
Spending coefficient αgi αgS > 0 αgC = αgS αgG = αgS αgF = αgS
Inflation coefficient απi απS > 0 απC > απS απG = απS απF = απS
Debt coefficient αdi αdS = 0 αdC = 0 αdG = 0 αdF > 0
∗Coefficients of loss functions for agents i ∈ {S,C,G, F}.
• We say that the central bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion when its pref-
erences satisfy the following inequality:
γ ≡ (1 + κ)απS
απC
− κ > 0 (12)
As in Chari and Kehoe (2007) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), governments
anticipate that the central bank will adjust inflation in response to debt issuance.
Moderate inflation aversion implies that inflation risesmore than is optimal when
debt increases. This excessive inflation response underlies one of the common
pool problems that generate debt bias in our model. A central bank exhibits
efficient inflation aversion if γ = 0 (in this case the inflationary bias caused by
the temptation to raise output is corrected.)
• Furthermore, we assume that steady-state assets of the public sector are not
excessively large:
R(dss) +R
′(dss)dss > 1, (13)
and
dss > −
(
1 + κ
χ
)
− ξ
κχ
, (14)
where ξ ≡ απC
αgS
(
q2L +
αgS
ν2
)
. When (13) does not hold, this means assets are so
large that saving less in steady state would imply more interest income in steady
state. Likewise, (14) holds under any reasonable calibration, because otherwise
the government is so wealthy that the central bank would wish to create a large
surprise deflation in order to increase the real value of public assets.
• Finally, since the objective function is quadratic, if the interest rate declines
very slowly with assets there may exist a steady-state public asset level sufficient
to finance the utility bliss point out of interest income alone. This unrealistic
scenario is ruled out by assuming scarcity, defined as follows:
z˜ ≡ x˜− x
ν
+ qLg˜ >
r20
4δ
. (15)
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3.2 The generic policy game
To describe policy-makers’ optimization problems in each institutional scenario S, let
dt−1 ≡ {dj,t−1}Jj=1 be the vector of real debts of all the regions in the monetary union at
the beginning of period t, and similarly let st−1 and t be vectors describing the shocks
to the government spending bliss point (its level at t − 1, and the innovation at t).
These three variables obviously affect equilibrium quantities. Pre-existing debt shifts
the current budget constraint; the lagged shock sj,t−1 shifts the expected demand for
public spending at the time expectations πet are formed; and thereafter the innovation
j,t determines the new level of public demand, g˜j,t = g˜+ρsj,t−1+j,t. Here we will study
equilibria that depend on the set of state variables Ωt ≡ (dt−1, st−1,t), but no others.
By restricting attention in this paper to equilibria that depend only on the minimal
state Ωt, we rule out equilibria with more complex forms of history dependence, such
as reputational effects.
Thus, consider a policy maker Ij who acts in region j only, where I ∈ {G,F}. The
generic decision problem of such a policy maker can be written as:
V Ij(Ωt) =
max
ΘIjt
−1
2
{
απIπ
2
t +
(
xj,t + ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜
)2
+ αgI (gj,t − g˜j,t)2 + αdId2j,t
}
+ βIEtV
Ij(Ωt+1) + Λ
Ij
t
[
dj,t −
(
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ(πet − πt)
)
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt − qj,tgj,t
]
.
(16)
This problem may represent the decision of a local government Gj or a local fiscal au-
thority Fj. The objective function contains quadratic losses as inflation, output, and
public spending deviate from their bliss points, with preference weights as described
in Table 1. We also allow for a loss term on debt, because we model the fiscal au-
thority’s mandate by assuming that it dislikes debt accumulation (αdF > 0). The set
of instruments controlled by this policy institution at time t is denoted ΘIjt , and the
multiplier on its budget constraint is ΛIjt . The price of public services gj,t differs with
instrument assignment, with qj,t = qL if public spending is allocated across services
by a local decision maker, or qj,t = qH if spending is instead chosen by some central
authority of the monetary union.
Alternatively, we may consider a policy maker I ∈ {C,G, F} that controls instru-
ments affecting all regions j:
V I(Ωt) =
max
ΘIt
−1
2
⎧⎨
⎩απIπ2t + 1J
J∑
j=1
⎡
⎣(xj,t + ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜)2 + αgI (gj,t − g˜j,t)2 + αdId2j,t
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βIEtV
I(Ωt+1) +
1
J
J∑
j=1
ΛIj,t
[
dj,t −
(
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ(πet − πt)
)
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt − qj,tgj,t
]
. (17)
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This institution’s preferences reflect losses in all regions j, and its decision must respect
a separate budget constraint for each region.
Finding a symmetric solution
We will derive Euler equation systems to characterize the policy functions implied
by each institutional scenario S. We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which
all regions j face the same parameters and the same initial conditions, and shocks, if
any, affect all regions equally. In a symmetric equilibrium, the state reduces to an
ordered triple of scalars, Ωt ≡ (dt−1, st−1, t), as there is no longer any variation in
debt or shocks across j.12 Equilibrium under scenario S can then be characterized
by four policy functions: inflation πt = I
S(Ωt), gross borrowing dt = B
S(Ωt), output
xt = X
S(Ωt), and government expenditure gt = G
S(Ωt).
For each policy game we solve the functional equations implied by the Euler system,
approximating the policy functions as Chebyshev polynomials, and evaluating expec-
tations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Reducing the dimension of the state space by
imposing symmetry makes it much easier to solve these nonlinear functional equations.
Given the policy functions, we can then simulate the dynamics and calculate some
statistics. For example, we can calculate steady-state debt, defined as the fixed point
of the gross borrowing function when shocks are zero:13
dSss = B
S(dSss, 0, 0). (18)
Controls versus residuals
We have written policy makers’ problems supposing that all the variables affected
by the choices of player I ∈ {Gj, Fj, C,G, F} are included in that player’s choice set,
ΘIt . But two cases should be distinguished. If a given variable yt appears only in the
choice set of one particular player I, then this means that I can unilaterally determine
the value of yt. In this case, we will refer to yt as a control variable of player I.
12No bars or j-subscripts are necessary on these variables since in a symmetric situation there is no
distinction between region-specific variables and cross-region averages.
13The fixed point of (18) using the borrowing function BS from our stochastic simulation, denoted
dSss, is the “stochastic steady state”, meaning the point to which the dynamics converge conditional
on an arbitrarily long sequence of shocks equal to zero. For some simulations, we compute equilibrium
assuming that the shocks  have zero variance, making the model deterministic; then the fixed point,
denoted dSns, is the nonstochastic steady state of the model.
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But sometimes a variable yt appears in the choice sets Θ
I
t and Θ
I′
t of two distinct
players I and I ′. In particular, the binding budget constraint at each t means that some
variable yt must be determined by the constraint, conditional on the controls chosen
by the players. We will then call yt a residual variable. For example, in some games
studied in section 3.3, inflation is chosen by the central bank, while taxes and debt are
chosen by the government(s); the quantity of public spending is then determined as the
equilibrium outcome of these simultaneous choices subject to the budget constraint.
Hence, in these games, public spending gj,t will be a residual, appearing in the choice
sets of government Gj and the central bank C. In some of the games of section
3.4, inflation is chosen by the central bank, while taxes and spending are chosen by
the government(s); new debt issuance dj,t is then a residual variable determined in
equilibrium by the budget constraint, appearing in the choice sets Θ
Gj
t and Θ
C
t . These
differences in instrument assignment turn out to be quantitatively important.
Welfare measures
To compare policy implications across regimes, it is useful to define notation for
the social welfare function. Each region’s welfare depends both on the policy regime,
and on the debts and shocks of all regions in the union; we define overall social welfare
by aggregating across all regions. Therefore, we calculate welfare as
W S(Ω) = − 1
J
J∑
j=1
LSj, (19)
the negative of the sum of the loss functions LSj, evaluated in the equilibrium that
occurs under institutional framework S, when the aggregate state is Ω ≡ (dt−1, st−1,t).
In a symmetric situation, equilibrium can be simplified by writing it as a function
of the ordered triple Ωt = (dt−1, st−1, t) rather than the full state variable Ω that char-
acterizes an asymmetric situation. We use the subscript ss to represent a stochastic
symmetric steady state. As such when we compare institutional scenarios S, we will
report debt dSss and inflation π
S
ss. While most of our reported results come from stochas-
tic simulations, to calculate business cycle costs we also perform some nonstochastic
simulations, keeping the symmetry assumption. Welfare in the nonstochastic scenarios
is indicated by subscript n. The subscript ns will distinguish non-stochastic steady
states from stochastic steady states (subscripted ss). Hence:
W Sns ≡ W Sn (dSns, 0, 0), (20)
W Sss ≡ W S(dSss, 0, 0). (21)
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A social planning problem
Before comparing equilibria across policy regimes, we establish a welfare benchmark
for our economy. For relevance in the European context, we consider a Ramsey planner
who maximizes social welfare taking market equilibrium conditions and region-specific
budget constraints as given. Our planner does not represent any existing European
institution, as it has unrealistic advantages in information and decision-making, but it
is useful as a benchmark against which hypothetical institutions can be compared, when
budgets are not aggregated across regions. For this purpose, we consider a planner that
is omniscient, thus it observes ωj,k,t; committed to a state-contingent inflation function;
cooperative, internalizing any externalities across borders; and Paretian, maximizing
welfare while obeying a distinct budget constraint for each region.
Since the planner commits to state-contingent policies that vary with the realization
of t, we write the planner’s value function in terms of variables known at t − 1, as
V P (dt−1, st−1), The ability to commit means that the planner chooses expected inflation
πet , subject to the constraint that this represents a rational expectation.
V P
(
dt−1, st−1
)
=
max
πet ,Θ
P
t
−1
2
Et−1
⎧⎨
⎩απSπ2t + 1J
J∑
j=1
⎡
⎣(xj,t + ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜)2 + αgS (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βSEt−1V P
(
dt, st
)
+
1
J
J∑
j=1
ΛPj,t
[
dj,t −
(
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ(πet − πt)
)
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt − qLgj,t
]
s.t. πet = Et−1πt. (22)
The controls ΘPt = {πt, {gj,t, τj,t, dj,t}Jj=1} should be understood as contingent plans
that vary with t, while π
e
t is an expectation computed prior to the realization of t.
The details of the solution to the planner problem are shown in the appendix. By
setting t = 0 for all t, we can find the steady state analytically:
d¯Pss = 0 and π
P
ss =
z¯
κ˜P
, (23)
where
z¯t =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
x˜j,t − xj,t
ν
+ qLg˜j,t
)
, (24)
κ˜P = κ+
απS
καgS
(
q2L +
αgS
ν2
)
. (25)
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3.3 Policy games with debt as a control variable
We now compare several policy environments in which some decision maker directly
controls debt emission. Since budget constraints must bind at all times, treating debt
as a control implies that some other variable must be determined at each t by the
constraint, as a residual. The games studied here assume that the variable which
adjusts, to ensure the constraint holds, is public spending.
3.3.1 Institutional scenarios
Scenario M: Status quo model of a large monetary union
First, consider a scenario resembling the Eurozone today, with a single central bank
that chooses inflation πt for the whole union, while J governments Gj each choose re-
gional taxes τjt and regional debt djt. Given τjt, djt, and πt, government j spends the
resources it has available, according to budget constraint (5), so public spending gjt is
determined as a residual. Thus, the central bank’s choice set is ΘCt ≡ {πt, {gj,t}Jj=1},
and government j’s choice set is Θ
Gj
t ≡ {τjt, djt, gj,t}. The market’s inflation expecta-
tions πet are set at the end of t − 1, rationally anticipating the outcome of the game
between the bank and the governments, but all policy makers act under discretion.
In each period and region, the marginal cost of tax distortions is set equal to the
marginal benefit of public spending according to a simple linear relation:
νxˆj,t =
αgS
qL
gˆj,t, (26)
where xˆj,t = xj,t − x˜ and gˆj,t = gj,t − g˜j,t and are the deviations of output and public
spending from their bliss points.
Since the central bank cannot commit, it is tempted to choose higher inflation than
that expected by the public. Its resulting tradeoff between inflation and union-wide
mean public spending is
αgS
qL
¯ˆgt = − απCπt
1 + κ+ χd¯t−1
≡ −απC π˘t, (27)
where we again use a bar to represent a cross-region mean, and have defined an adjusted
inflation variable, π˘t ≡ πt1+κ+χd¯t−1 .
When solving the planner’s problem (see the appendix) we find that it equates the
marginal cost of inflation to the average marginal benefit of public spending, so that
αgS
qL
¯ˆgt = −απSκ πt. Thus, as long as αgG = αgS, the government trades off output versus
public spending just as the planner does. But the dynamics of the monetary union
differ from those of the planning problem in several intuitive ways. We see that the
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central bank tends to choose more inflation than the planner would, especially when
debt is high. On the other hand, if it dislikes inflation more than the public and the
planner do (απC > απS), this will partially offset the inflation bias caused by its lack
of commitment.
Plugging (26) and (27) into the period budget constraint (5), we find that average
debt in the monetary union evolves according to
d¯t = R
(
d¯t−1
)
d¯t−1 + (1 + χd¯t−1)(πet − πt)− κ˘(d¯t−1)π˘t + z¯t, (28)
where κ˘(d¯t−1) ≡ κ(1 + κ+ χd¯t−1) + απCαgS
(
q2L +
αgS
ν2
)
. Under the parameter assumptions
of Table 1, if d¯t−1 ≥ 0 and the central bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion,
then κ˘(d¯t−1) < (1 + κ + χd¯t−1)κ˜P , which says that due to the central bank’s lack of
commitment, the monetary union has more inflation, relative to its level of private
output and public spending, than the planner’s solution does.
Next, consider the Euler equation that governs fiscal policy over time. If country
j is large, its choice of djt will affect the interest rate (both for its own debt and for
other union members); its debt will also influence the choices of other decision makers
at time t+ 1. But we will simplify by focusing on the limit of a large monetary union
(J = ∞) in which each individual country is infinitesimal. In this case, government j
ignores all the spillovers from its debt, and the region-j Euler equation simplifies to14
gˆj,t = βGR(d¯t)Etgˆj,t+1. (29)
When all countries are symmetric, we can use (27) to rewrite the Euler equation in
terms of inflation:15
π˘t = βGR(dt)Etπ˘t+1. (30)
Note that since government j controls debt, (30) reflects the government’s discount
factor, in contrast with the planner’s solution, where society’s discount factor appears.
Second, since country j’s debt is a negligible part of the debt of the union, government
j simply takes the interest rate as given. This differs from the planner’s solution, in
which an R′ term appears, because the planner realizes that choosing higher debt in all
14The online appendix to Basso and Costain (2016) states the Euler equations for the finite J case,
in which each country j is non-negligible, so that the effects of its debt decision on subsequent choices
cannot be ignored.
15Again, we drop the bars on variables since there is no distinction between country-specific
variables and cross-sectional averages. Note that if there are instead some asymmetries across re-
gions, then (30) only holds approximately. The exact equation is then π˘t = βS(R(d¯t))π˘t+1 −
βSR
′(d¯t)
αgSκ
απSqL
Covt+1(gˆk,t+1, dk,t). But the covariance term is negligible when differences between
countries are small, so all results in this paper are robust to small cross-country differences.
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regions raises the interest rate (see (79) in the appendix). Both of these effects imply
faster inflation growth in the monetary union than what we observe in the planner’s
solution; since (26) and (27) link inflation to xˆt and gˆt, the output and public spending
loss terms also grow more quickly in the monetary union than the planner would wish.
Rapid growth of these distortions represents deficit bias: it means that the economy
suffers relatively small distortions in the near term, but finances the resulting deficit by
accumulating debt, which must be paid off in the future by suffering larger distortions
in the long run.
Illustrating our solution methodology, the symmetric solution of this scenario can
then be characterized by policy functions BM(Ωt), I
M(Ωt), and I˘
M(Ωt) =
IM (Ωt)
1+κ+χd¯t−1
such that the following equations hold:
BM(Ωt) =R (dt−1) dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(Et−1[IM(Ωt)]− IM(Ωt))− κ˘I˘M(Ωt) + z˜t, (31)
I˘M(Ωt) = βG
(
β−1S + δB
M(Ωt)
)
EtI˘
M(BM(Ωt), st, t+1). (32)
where z˜t ≡ ν−1(x˜−x)+qLg˜t. Government spending and output can then be calculated
from
αgS
qL
GˆM(Ωt) = −απC I˘M(Ωt) and νXˆM(Ωt) = αgSqL GˆM(Ωt).
Scenario I: A single country with its own monetary policy
The deficit bias suffered by a monetary union can also be seen by comparing it to
the case of a single country with its own independent central bank. The instrument
assignment is identical to the monetary union environment (ΘCt ≡ {πt, gt}, ΘGt ≡
{τt, dt, gt}) but we focus on the case J = 1, instead of the opposite extreme J = ∞.
The tradeoffs between output, public spending, and inflation are unchanged, so (26)
and (27) still apply. Therefore the equation governing per capita debt is the same as
in the monetary union:
dt = R (dt−1) dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(πet − πt)− κ˘(dt−1)π˘t + z˜t. (33)
The differences show up in the Euler equation, which becomes16
π˘t = βGEt
(
R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt +
(
γ + χ
απG
απC
dt
)
∂πt+1
∂dt
)
π˘t+1. (34)
The parameter γ, defined in (12), indexes the strength of the central bank’s preference
for surprise inflation.
As in scenario M , the discount factor in the Euler equation is βG, reflecting govern-
ment impatience, which raises inflation growth. But other terms in the Euler equation
16To solve equations (33)-(34), we can rewrite them in terms of d and π˘ only, using the fact that
π(d) = (1 + κ+ χd)π˘(d) to substitute out π′(d) = (1 + κ+ χd)π˘′(d) + χπ˘(d).
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slow down inflation growth, relative to a monetary union. The government of a single
country recognizes that its debt affects the interest rate it pays, so the term R′(dt)dt
appears in the Euler equation, which reduces inflation growth whenever dt > 0. Sec-
ond, the central bank has an incentive to create surprise inflation (i) to boost output
and (ii) to decrease the real cost of servicing nominal debt; the strength of these in-
centives goes through the parameters γ and χ, respectively.17 Given the bank’s lack
of commitment, the government of a single country knows that its debt will influence
central bank inflation, and hence it cuts its deficit to correct for these inflation bias
terms. Again, this reduces inflation growth, compared with scenario M , where each
government regards the impact of its own debt as negligible.
Scenario G: A federal government for a monetary union
Creating a single government for the monetary union makes its political structure
formally identical to a single country, so our analysis of the J = 1 case applies. There-
fore, as we argued above, two forms of deficit bias should disappear when a monetary
union adopts a single government. Like a single country, but unlike a small member
of a monetary union, a federal government internalizes the effect of its debt on the
interest rate it pays. This gives it an incentive to accumulate less debt than member
states of a monetary union do. Similarly, the federal government recognizes the fact
that the central bank will raise inflation in response to any rise in the average debt
level, whereas small member states in a monetary union would fail to internalize this
effect and would therefore choose more debt on average.
However, in the European context, this setup has a major disadvantage. It gives up
“subsidiarity”: spending decisions are taken at the union level, where less information
is available. This raises the price of public services to qH > qL, more expensive than
they would be if they were allocated locally. The conditions linking inflation, public
spending, and output would then be
¯ˆgt = −απCqH
αgS
π˘t, (35)
¯ˆxt = −απC
ν
π˘t. (36)
Comparing with the corresponding relations for the monetary union, (26) and (27),
(35)-(36) show that the relation between inflation and output is unchanged, but that
for any given level of inflation and debt, the distance of government services from their
bliss point is increased.
17Under the parameter assumptions of Sec. 3.1, including moderate inflation aversion, we have
0 < γ < 1. It can also be shown, under weak assumptions, that ∂π∂d > 0. Therefore these additional
terms in the Euler equation reduce inflation growth.
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Summarizing, the dynamics of the symmetric case are analogous to (33)-(34), except
that they now refer to per capita debt in the whole union.
dt = R (dt−1) dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(πet − πt)− κ˘G(dt−1)π˘t + z˜Gt , (37)
π˘t = βGEt
(
R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt +
(
γ + χ
απG
απC
dt
)
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
π˘t+1, (38)
The only difference from scenario I is that public services are more expensive, which
alters the parameters in the equations as follows:
κ˘G(dt−1) ≡ κ(1 + κ+ χdt−1) + απC
αgS
(
q2H +
αgG
ν2
)
, (39)
z˜Gt ≡ ν−1(x˜− x) + qH g˜t. (40)
Scenario Fj: Delegation to regional fiscal authorities
While a federal government would avoid some aspects of the deficit bias that plagues
a monetary union, establishing such a government seems a very distant prospect in Eu-
rope today. Just to mention a few of the most critical problems involved, setting up
a central or federal government for Europe would require (1) convincing local politi-
cians to give up power in favor of new central institutions; (2) harmonizing local laws
and constitutions sufficiently to permit European governance; and (3) finding ways to
efficiently address local decisions via central or federal institutions. Even if these chal-
lenges could be overcome (slowly) from a technical perspective, establishing legitimacy
of new European institutions would remain (insurmountably?) difficult, all the more
so as nationalism has grown with recent crises.
This motivates us to ask instead whether delegation of fiscal instruments might serve
as a shortcut to credible long-run debt sustainability, avoiding many of the dilemmas
listed above. Delegating just one (or a few) effectively-designed fiscal instruments might
have a very large impact on budget balance, but would involve less surrender of power
by local politicians than the establishment of a federal government. Relatively fewer
changes to laws and constitutions would be required, and most local fiscal decisions
would remain under local control. Therefore, we now analyze the macroeconomic
implications of some policy games involving delegated fiscal powers.
First, we consider region-specific delegation. Concretely, we consider policy games
in which the central bank chooses inflation for the union, and regional governments
choose taxes and allocate public spending, but the choice of how much debt to issue is
delegated to an independent regional fiscal authority Fj. The overall quantity of local
public spending is treated as a residual variable; thus the instrument assignments are
given by ΘCt ≡ {πt, {gj,t}Jj=1}, ΘGjt ≡ {τjt, gj,t}, and ΘFjt ≡ {djt, gj,t}. That is to say,
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the amount of money spent by government Gj is only partly under its control (through
its choice of taxes), but the allocation of these funds across different uses is left entirely
in its hands.
As in scenario M , analysis is greatly simplified by considering a symmetric equilib-
rium with many small countries. Formally, assuming all countries are symmetric and
J = ∞ implies that each country is infinitesimal, so it ignores the impact of its own
debt on interest rates, inflation, and other countries’ debt. Then the Euler equation is
gˆj,t +
qLαdF
αgF
dj,t = βFR(d¯t)Etgˆj,t+1. (41)
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we can then rewrite the dynamics in terms of
inflation and average debt:
dt = R (dt−1) dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(πet − πt)− κ˘(dt−1)π˘t + z˜t (42)
π˘t =
αdF
απC
dt + βFR(dt)Etπ˘t+1. (43)
Comparing (28)-(30), the equilibrium system for scenario M , with (42)-(43), we see
two effects of the fiscal authority that inhibit inflation growth. First, for a given dt,
inflation grows more slowly in the presence of the fiscal authority if the government is
less patient than the fiscal authority (βG < βF ). Second, inflation grows more slowly
in the presence of the fiscal authority whenever dt > 0, as long as the fiscal authority
dislikes debt (αdF > 0).
Scenario F: Delegation to a union-wide fiscal authority
Rather than delegating debt issuance to a fiscal authority Fj within each region,
a possibly better alternative might be to delegate the issuance of each country’s debt
to a single authority F established for the union as a whole. Such an authority would
have an incentive to take externalities across regions into account. In this case, the
symmetric dynamics are given by
dt = R(dt−1)dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(πet − πt)− κ˘(dt−1)π˘t + z˜t, (44)
π˘t =
αdF
απC
dt + βFEt
(
R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt +
(
γ + χ
απG
απC
dt
)
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
π˘t+1. (45)
These equations are simplified using the parameter assumptions in Table 1.
This system combines two properties we have seen before. Like a model with fiscal
authorities at the regional level, debt slows down inflation growth, as long as the fiscal
authority is debt averse (αdF > 0). But in addition, inflation growth is affected by the
impact of debt on the interest rate (R′) and on inflation (∂πt+1
∂d¯t
), because the union-
wide fiscal authority knows it can alter aggregate debt, just as the government did in
scenario I. Since inflation responds positively to a rise in debt, and the central bank
is assumed to exhibits moderate inflation aversion (implying γ > 0), inflation growth
is further reduced in this scenario, compared with scenario Fj.
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3.3.2 Results
Parameters
We choose parameters so that our quantitative results can be given a plausible
economic interpretation, in spite of the reduced-form nature of our model. Specifically,
we calibrate with reference to the nonstochastic steady state of the baseline monetary
union scenario, taking care to respect the restrictions stated in Section 3.1.
The time unit is a year, and the goods unit is normalized so that annual private
output xMns is one in the nonstochastic steady state of scenario M . We set the discount
rate to βS = 1.02
−1, and set δ = 0.03, so that the annual real interest rate is 2% when
debt is zero and 5% when debt is one (100% of output). Since European debt levels
still appear to have a strong tendency to increase, we assume that steady state debt
in scenario M is substantially higher, at dMns = 2. This is consistent with βG = 1.08
−1.
We set the fiscal authority’s discount rate halfway between those of the planner and
the government: βF = (βS + βG)/2. We assume that half of debt is nominal, χ = 0.5.
We set ν = 1, implying that a one percentage point rise in tax rates decreases
output by 1%. Steady state taxes must be mutually consistent with steady state
output; assuming steady-state taxes are τMns = 0.5, we must have x¯ = x
M
ns+ ντ
M
ns = 1.5.
We assume that inflation will rise to 10% (πMns = 0.1) in the steady state of the monetary
union,18 and that κ = 0.2, meaning that each percentage point of inflation generates
revenues equal to 0.2% of output. Given our assumptions so far, if locally-produced
public goods cost the same as private goods, we can infer that steady-state public
services in the monetary union are gMns =
1
qL
(
τMns + κπ
M
ns − r0dMns − δ(dMns)2
)
= 0.36. We
assume that centralized provision of public goods is 50% more costly, qH = 1.5.
The bliss points x˜ and g˜ are hard to infer from steady-state behavior alone. We
set both to a level far above actual output, x˜ = g˜ = 5, and we confirm through
robustness calculations that large changes in these bliss points (x˜ = g˜ = 3 or 10) leave
our results qualitatively unchanged. Given our calibration targets and parameters
thus far, the first-order condition between public and private output requires αgS =
νqL(x
M
ns − x˜)/(gMns − g˜) = 0.8621. Likewise, the first-order condition between output
and inflation requires απC = −|xMns − x˜|(1 + κ + χdMns)/πMns = 88. We calibrate the
social cost of inflation so that the planner’s solution has 2% inflation in steady state,
which implies απS = 39.3333. Finally, we set the fiscal authority’s loss coefficient on
deviations of debt from target to αdF = 0.5.
18Note that we have abstracted from default. Hence, steady-state inflation is a stand-in for the
many costs associated with excessive debt, which is why we choose a rather high calibration target
for πMns.
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Figure 1: Borrowing and inflation policies. Comparing institutional scenarios
Notes: Comparing policy functions across institutional scenarios, assuming debt is a control variable.
Left: Gross borrowing: debt dt as a function of dt−1.
Right: Inflation πt as a function of dt−1.
Black: planner. Blue: monetary union. Green: one country. Magenta: regional FAs. Red: Union-wide
FA. Cyan: federal government. Red stars: steady states.
Policy functions
We characterize the behavior of each scenario S by calculating the nonlinear policy
functions dt = B
S(Ωt) and πt = I
S(Ωt) consistent with the Euler equations derived
from that scenario. In this subsection we report the results for two specifications, both
of which are stochastic: an i.i.d. and an autocorrelated version. In the simulations, the
public spending demand shock t affects all regions j symmetrically and is assumed
to have mean zero, standard deviation 0.02. For the autocorrelated version, we set
ρ = 0.7, so shocks to the spending bliss point die out fairly slowly.19
Figure 1 shows the policy functions under the i.i.d. specification, for scenarios P
(black), M (blue), I (green), Fj (magenta), F (red), and G (cyan). The right-hand
19For comparison when we calculate the costs of business cycles, we will also calculate a fully
nonstochastic specification. The nonstochastic case can be computed by assuming that t has mean
and variance equal zero, or by dropping t entirely from the model so that the policy functions depend
on debt only. We have run the calculations both ways, and obtained virtually identical results.
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panel shows that the planner chooses nonzero inflation (πPss = 0.02) in the steady
state (dPss = 0). Lacking any nondistortionary revenue source, the planner collects a
small amount of seignorage, increasing very slightly with debt, to optimally trade off
the marginal losses from inflation and from distortionary taxes. In the left panel, the
borrowing function dt = B
P (dt−1, 0, 0) has a slope of roughly 0.5. That is, when the
current debt level is one percentage point higher, the planner pays off half within one
period and carries the other half over to the next period.
Relative to the planner’s policies (black), the green curves that represent the equi-
librium policies of a single country (scenario I) are shifted upwards. The inflation
function II is both higher and steeper than the planner’s policy IP , because monetary
policy in scenario I is a discretionary decision, and the temptation to create surprise
inflation becomes stronger as debt increases. The borrowing function BI lies above the
planner’s policy BP because the impatience of the democratic government in scenario
I leads to more borrowing. In steady state, debt in scenario I rises to dIss = 71.5% of
output, with an inflation rate of 7% (see Table 2 for the numbers.)
The policy biases affecting scenario I are reinforced by free-riding effects in the sta-
tus quo monetary union scenario M (blue). The borrowing policy BM lies everywhere
above BI , because governments in scenarioM ignore how their debt affects the interest
rate and the incentives of the central bank. Steady-state debt rises to dMss = 199.9% of
output. On the other hand, the inflation policy IM lies slightly below II , because the
central bank recognizes that government incentives are worse in the monetary union
than in a single country, so it restrains inflation at any given debt level. Nonetheless,
since steady-state debt is so much higher in the monetary union, steady-state inflation
also rises in scenario M , to πMss = 10.0%.
In contrast, establishing a fiscal authority shifts the borrowing function down. The
borrowing function of scenario Fj lies below that of scenario M , both because the
regional fiscal authorities are more patient than regional governments, and because the
fiscal authorities are averse to debt. Steady-state debt therefore falls to dFjss = 0.179.
20
Also, the borrowing function BFj is less steeply sloped than BM (slope 0.3 rather than
0.5). This is a sign of austerity: when debt increases for any reason, it converges back
to its steady state more quickly in the economy with a fiscal authority than it does
in the status quo monetary union. Moreover, although the inflation policy IFj lies
(slightly) above II and IM , the lower steady state debt in scenario Fj also reduces
steady-state inflation, to πFjss = 0.058.
20The fact that BFj lies below BI is calibration-specific; it is not a general result.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1710
Table 2: Debt, inflation, and welfare in scenarios S where debt is a control variable∗
Transition Crisis cost,b,c
Debta Inflation Welfareb gainb Crisis costb,c fixing debt Cyclical costb,d
dSss π
S
ss W
S
ss −WMss WS(dMss ,0,0)−WMss WS(dSss,0,	g0)−WSss WS(0,0,	g0)−WS(0,0,0) WSss−WSn (dSss,0,0)
Temporary shocks (autocorrelation 0)
Scenario P: Planner
0.1% 2.0% +19.5% +14.9% −0.39% −0.39% −0.12%
Scenario I: single country with independent central bank
71.5% 7.0% +15.2% +12.0% −0.41% −0.39% −0.12%
Scenario M: status quo monetary union
199.9% 10.0% 0% 0% −0.48% −0.42% −0.13%
Scenario Fj: Monetary union with regional fiscal authorities
17.9% 5.8% +18.3% +13.9% −0.39% −0.39% −0.13%
Scenario F: Monetary union with union-wide fiscal authority
8.7% 5.6% +18.6% +14.1% −0.39% −0.39% −0.13%
Scenario G: Monetary union with union-wide federal government
78.4% 5.5% +14.9% +12.6% −0.47% −0.45% −0.17%
aDebt expressed as a fraction of steady state private output of baseline scenario M .
bAll welfare changes stated as equivalent variations of private output, starting from nonstochastic steady state of baseline scenario M .
c“Crisis” refers to a four-percent rise in public goods demand at time 0, g0 = 0.02.
dComparing stochastic economy with gt ∼ N(0, 0.02) to nonstochastic economy (gt ≡ 0).
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Table 3: Debt, inflation, and welfare in scenarios S where debt is a control variable∗
Transition Crisis cost,b,c
Debta Inflation Welfareb gainb Crisis costb,c fixing debt Cyclical costb,d
dSss π
S
ss W
S
ss −WMss WS(dMss ,0,0)−WMss WS(dSss,0,	g0)−WSss WS(0,0,	g0)−WS(0,0,0) WSss−WSn (dSss,0,0)
Correlated shocks (autocorrelation 0.7)
Scenario P: Planner
0.1% 2.0% +19.4% +14.8% −0.75% −0.75% −0.86%
Scenario I: single country with independent central bank
71.4% 7.0% +15.3% +12.2% −0.78% −0.75% −0.68%
Scenario M: status quo monetary union
199.7% 10.0% 0% 0% −0.90% −0.82% −0.83%
Scenario Fj: Monetary union with regional fiscal authorities
17.9% 5.8% +18.4% +14.1% −0.75% −0.74% −0.70%
Scenario F: Monetary union with union-wide fiscal authority
8.7% 5.6% +18.7% +14.2% −0.75% −0.75% −0.71%
Scenario G: Monetary union with union-wide federal government
78.3% 5.5% 14.8% +12.6% −0.90% −0.88% −0.95%
aDebt expressed as a fraction of steady state private output of baseline scenario M .
bAll welfare changes stated as equivalent variations of private output, starting from nonstochastic steady state of baseline scenario M .
c“Crisis” refers to a four-percent rise in public goods demand at time 0, g0 = 0.02.
dComparing stochastic economy with gt ∼ N(0, 0.02) to nonstochastic economy (gt ≡ 0).
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Finally, scenario F combines the debt-reducing incentives of scenarios I and Fj.
Like the regional fiscal authorities, a union-wide fiscal authority is less impatient than
national governments, and dislikes debt accumulation (the weights on per capita debt
in the loss functions in scenarios F and Fj are assumed equal). Like the government
of a single country, the union-wide fiscal authority internalizes the impact of its debt
on the interest rate and on central bank behavior (the effects of per capita debt on the
interest rate and on central bank preferences are assumed equal in scenarios F and I).
Therefore the borrowing function in scenario F lies below curves BI and BFj, which
both lie below BM . The resulting steady state debt level is dFss = 0.056, slightly below
that in scenario Fj.21
Interpreting the effects on debt
The steady-state debt ranking depicted in Figure 1 can be understood by consider-
ing the underlying biases that operate in each institutional scenario. The social planner
sets dPss = 0, the optimal steady-state debt. A decentralized economy where all institu-
tions have the same preferences, and where the time inconsistency problem is offset to
the appropriate degree that eliminates inflation bias, would also achieve this optimal
level of debt. In our set-up these conditions are represented by the parameterization
βG = βS and γ = 0.
22 However, under the more realistic assumption that democrati-
cally elected officials act as if they are less patient than society as a whole, a positive
bias pushes up steady state debt. In a single country economy, this increase in debt
levels due to impatience is curtailed because the government is aware that (i) higher
debt worsens inflation bias in equilibrium, since it makes the central bank more willing
to raise inflation to boost output and inflate away nominal debt, and (ii) high levels
of debt increase real interest rates (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999, and Leith and
Wren-Lewis, 2013, for discussion of these debt attenuation motives).
While the members of a monetary union would benefit, in principle, from cooper-
atively restraining debt for the reasons just mentioned, in equilibrium each member
has an incentive to free-ride, increasing spending and reducing taxes, leaving debt con-
trol to the others. This represents a classic common pool problem, in which the only
equilibrium is that members accumulate too much debt because they fail to internalize
21As we discussed in Basso and Costain (2016), steady state debt in scenario Fj can be proved
higher than steady state debt in the planner’s solution, and steady state debt in scenario F is lower
than that in scenario Fj. But the ranking of debt between scenarios P and F is ambiguous: a union-
wide fiscal authority may actually choose a steady-state debt level that is inefficiently low compared
with the social planner.
22See Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), Chari and Kehoe (2008), and Basso and Costain (2016), Section
4.3.2, for in-depth discussion of these points.
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the effects on interest rates and inflation. Regional fiscal delegation, by shifting con-
trol of debt to an institution that is more impatient and less debt tolerant, provides a
countervailing force that limits the biases caused by democratic and non-cooperative
decision processes. Union-wide fiscal delegation has the same effects, but in addition
internalizes the impact of each member’s debt on equilibrium, directly taking account
of the tragedy of the commons.
Welfare implications
Besides lowering debt and inflation, Tables 2-3 also show that delegation to a fiscal
authority implies a large improvement in social welfare (see the third columns of the
tables). The steady-state social welfare W Sss of scenario S is reported as an equivalent
variation in private sector output x, compared with scenario M (hence the welfare
level in scenario M is shown as zero, by construction). The planner’s solution has
the highest steady-state welfare, representing a 19.5% permanent increase in private
sector output, relative to scenario M . This welfare gain both reflects the fact that it is
calculated at the lowest steady-state debt in the table, and the fact that, by definition,
it is the policy that optimizes social welfare at any given debt level. We have also seen
that the scenarios with higher steady-state debt have higher steady-state inflation.
In scenarios M , I, Fj, and F , inflation is related to public and private spending by
(26) and (27), linking higher inflation with larger gaps of public and private spending
from their bliss points. Therefore the ranking of social welfare across these scenarios
is the opposite of their debt ranking: WMss < W
I
ss < W
Fj
ss < W
F
ss. Crucially, the fiscal
delegation scenarios lie substantially closer to the planner’s welfare level than to that
of the monetary union.
Of course, these welfare comparisons only apply in steady state; switching to a new
institutional regime does not produce welfare gains as large as those seen in the third
column of the tables immediately. Instead, for an economy that starts with a large
stock of debt, delegating fiscal responsibilities (or implementing the planner’s solution)
initially implies a costly transition period in which existing debt is paid off. To take
the costs of this initial austerity into account, the fourth columns of Tables 2 and 3
report the gains of moving to each possible alternative scenario S, starting from the
steady state debt level of scenario M . That is, we compare the welfare each alternative
S evaluated at the debt level inherited from the monetary union, W S(dMss , 0, 0), with
the welfare WMss ≡ WM(dMss , 0, 0) of remaining in scenario M .
Even taking into account transition costs, the benefits of delegating instruments
to a fiscal authority are very large, roughly equivalent to a 14% permanent increase
in private sector output, relative to the monetary union. This represents most of the
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potential welfare gain from moving to the planner’s solution, which (including transi-
tion costs) is equivalent to a 15% output increase, relative to scenario M . Subtracting
the numbers in the third and fourth columns of Tables 2-3, we see that the initial
austerity cost of fiscal delegation is also large (roughly 4% of output), but the gains
from delegation are sufficient to overwhelm these costs.
Considering that we are solving a reduced-form model, these welfare numbers should
be taken as a qualitative illustration of the effects of fiscal delegation, rather than a
precise quantitative assessment of those effects. Nonetheless, finding welfare gains that
are orders of magnitude larger than Lucas’ (1987) estimate of the cost of business cy-
cles is unsurprising, because interest payments on sovereign debt (owned by foreigners)
are subtracted off of national income, directly affecting the budget available for con-
sumption. Hence, the welfare difference between scenarios M and S, when expressed
as an equivalent output variation, is at least as large as the steady-state change in the
sovereign interest burden, r(dMss )d
M
ss − r(dSss)dSss. Moreover, besides the reduction in
the sovereign interest burden, moving from scenario M to any of the other scenarios
considered here also implies a large decrease in tax distortions and inflation.
Impulse responses
The results thus far suggest that fiscal delegation improves welfare by reducing
long-run debt. But debt accumulation offers a smoothing mechanism that may im-
prove welfare in response to shocks; so it is important to ask whether fiscal delegation
eliminates or weakens a buffer that protects the economy against excessive fluctuation
of payoff-relevant variables. To this end, Figures 2 and 3 compare impulse responses
to shocks to the demand for public spending across scenarios P (black with squares),
M (blue with stars), I (green with “x”), Fj (magenta with diamonds), F (red with
dots), and G (cyan line). We think of an increase in the demand for public spending as
a reasonable stand-in for recent crises in Europe and other advanced economies, where
large amounts of state funds were used to recapitalize banking systems, in an effort to
avoid a major contraction of credit supply to the private sector.
Concretely, the figures suppose a 4% increase in g˜j,t (from 5 to 5.2) at time 2
(the initial steady state position is shown at time 1, for reference).23 In Fig. 2, the
shock is assumed to be uncorrelated over time (as in Table 2), while in Fig. 3, it has
autocorrelation ρ = 0.7. We report the impulse responses as deviations from steady
state (rather than log deviations) so that the absolute size of each response can be
visually compared across scenarios S.
23This is a big shock. Since the bliss point g˜ is far above equilibrium public spending, fully accomo-
dating this demand shock (raising spending by 0.2) would require much more than a 4% percentage
increase in public spending.
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Figure 2: Temporary public demand shock. Comparing institutional scenarios.
Notes: Impulse responses of debt, inflation, government spending, output, and instantaneous and
cumulated utility to a temporary 4% increase in the public spending bliss point g˜, assuming debt is a
control variable.
In the planner’s solution of the uncorrelated specification (black in Fig. 2), gov-
ernment spending rises from approximately 0.36 to 0.40 at the time of the shock. To
finance this increase, debt rises from d1 = d
P
ss = 0 to d2 = 0.03, postponing almost
three quarters of the financing to the future. Therefore, there is a persistent decrease
in public spending for t ≥ 3, and a persistent decrease in output at times t ≥ 2, re-
flecting increased taxes. Also, the planner imposes a small burst of surprise inflation
on impact, raising the inflation rate temporarily from 2% to 2.04%. Since output and
public spending both fall relative to their bliss points, and inflation rises, the flow of
utility falls on impact by 0.7 utils.24
24The figures illustrate the welfare impact as measured in utils. For welfare measures expressed as
equivalent output variations, see the fifth columns of Tables 2-3.
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Turning next to scenario M , the public demand shock is again accommodated,
to roughly the same extent that it was in the planner’s solution. But the monetary
union relies less on increased taxation, so the fall in output is slightly smaller (by
0.011) than it is in the planner’s problem (where output falls by 0.014 on impact).
Instead, the monetary union issues slightly more debt than the planner does (it runs
a deficit of 0.034, raising the debt stock from dMss = 1.999 to d = 2.033 on impact).
More importantly, debt is much more persistent in scenario M than it is in scenario
P , so the shock has greater medium-term effects. Unlike the planner’s solution, where
inflation rises only on impact (when it is unexpected), inflation in the monetary union
responds strongly to increased debt, so there is a persistent rise in inflation and fall in
utility. The last two panels of the graph show the utility loss– the fifth panel shows
the deviation in utility from its steady state level, and the sixth cumulates this utility
loss over time. While the utility loss is smaller on impact in scenario M than it is in
scenario P , the ranking is reversed in the following period; the persistent losses in the
monetary union eventually cumulate to a total utility loss of roughly 0.9 utils, while in
the planner’s solution the cumulated losses are only 0.8.
Thus, scenariosM and P both permit a substantial rise in public spending, and both
delay most of the financing to the future, but the deficit bias in scenario M makes the
costs much more persistent. If we now compare what happens in the fiscal delegation
scenarios (magenta and red lines), we see that the response is less accomodative; public
spending rises by approximately 0.035 rather than 0.04 on impact. Also, there is less
smoothing over time; the rise in debt is around one-third smaller than it is in scenarios
M and P . Hence, more of the fiscal impact must be absorbed on impact by raising
taxes, so the fall in private sector output is much larger (it decreases by 0.18 under
fiscal delegation, rather than 0.11 in scenario M). Hence, instantaneous utility falls
more on impact under fiscal delegation than it does in the other scenarios considered;
but the advantage of this austerity is that debt becomes much less persistent. Just one
period after the shock, output and instantaneous utility are already higher in scenarios
Fj and F than they are in scenarios M and P . And when we sum the utility impact
of the shock over time, the overall loss in the fiscal delegation scenarios is virtually
indistinguishable from that in the planner’s solution, but is somewhat less than the
cumulated loss in the monetary union. In other words, while the fiscal authorities
impose painful austerity on impact, this is compensated by a rapid recovery of utility,
so in intertemporal terms they perform almost as well as the social planner.
These welfare conclusions are restated numerically in Table 2. The fifth column
reports the welfare impact of a four percent rise in public spending demand, starting
from steady state, in each scenario. That is, it reports W S(dSss, 0, 
g
0)−W S(dSss, 0, 0) for
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each scenario S, where g0 = 0.02, which is the present discounted value of the utility
losses caused by the shock graphed in Fig. 2. Unsurprisingly, the intertemporal welfare
loss is smallest in the social planner’s solution. But strikingly, even though output
falls more sharply on impact in the fiscal delegation scenarios than it does in scenario
M , the intertemporal welfare cost of the shock is approximately equal in the fiscal
delegation scenarios and in the planner’s solution, roughly equivalent in both cases to
a 0.39% permanent decrease in private output.25 In contrast, the smoother but more
persistent fall in output and rise in inflation implied by scenario M is somewhat more
costly, equivalent to a permanent loss of 0.42.% of private output.
We reach similar conclusions when we consider the impact of an autocorrelated
demand shock, in Table 3 and Fig. 3. Again, public spending accommodates the
demand shock more fully in the status quo monetary union than it does in the fiscal
delegation scenarios. Much more debt accumulates in scenario M than in the fiscal
delegation scenarios; the fiscal authorities raise taxes more in response to the shock,
causing private output to fall further over the first three periods of impact than it does
in scenario M .26 But again, the greater austerity of the fiscal authorities makes debt
less persistent, so from the fourth period onwards, instantaneous utility is higher in
scenarios Fj and F than it is in scenario M . Cumulating utility over time, the overall
utility loss caused by the crisis is similar in the fiscal delegation scenarios and in the
planner’s solution (Table 3, column five shows that it valued like a permanent 0.75%
decrease in private output), but is substantially larger in scenario M (representing a
permanent 0.90% decrease in private output).
A caveat to these results is that we have performed all these calculations at the
steady states corresponding to each scenario S. Steady state debt and inflation are
highest in scenario M , and steady state public and private consumption are corre-
spondingly lower. Since the utility function is concave, the marginal cost of any given
fluctuation in π, gˆ, or xˆ is higher in the status quo monetary union than it is in the
other scenarios. To control for this difference, the sixth columns of Tables 2 and 3
compare the cost of a public spending demand shock across scenarios, starting at a
fixed level of debt, namely the planner’s steady state dPns = 0. Therefore we report
the welfare cost W S(0, 0, g0)−W S(0, 0, 0), with g0 = 0.02. Controlling for debt in this
25To facilitate comparison of all the welfare changes that we report, equivalent variations are always
calculated as changes relative to the nonstochastic steady state of the monetary union scenario.
26An important qualitative difference in this case is that the planner does not use debt to smooth
the shock. When the shock is sufficiently persistent, the planner chooses to avoid running a deficit,
in order to avoid paying off the accumulated debt while public sector demand remains high. But our
comparison between scenario M and the fiscal delegation scenarios is essentially unchanged.
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Figure 3: Autocorrelated public demand shock. Comparing institutional scenarios.
Notes: Impulse responses of debt, inflation, government spending, output, and instantaneous and
cumulated utility to a 4% increase in the public spending bliss point g˜ (autocorrelation ρ = 0.7),
assuming debt is a control variable.
way decreases the difference in the costs associated with the shock across scenarios, but
even here the shock is substantially more costly in scenarioM , compared with the fiscal
delegation scenarios and with the planner, both for the i.i.d. and the autocorrelated
shock specifications.
Finally, rather than considering a one-time “crisis”, an alternative way to evaluate
the impact of fiscal delegation on countercyclical policy is to calculate the costs of
business cycles in the sense of Lucas (1987). To do so, we recalculate the equilibrium
of each scenario S under the assumption that shocks have variance zero, to define the
nonstochastic value function W Sn (d, 0, 0). We then calculate the difference in social
welfare between the stochastic and nonstochastic economies, evaluated at the same
debt level and conditioning on the same level of public sector demand, as if someone
could simply flip a switch to eliminate all uncertainty in the economy. Concretely,
we perform the calculation starting from the stochastic steady-state debt dSss level of
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scenario S, assuming public demand is at its steady state (s =  = 0), so we report
the welfare difference W Sn (d
S
ss, 0, 0) − W S(dSss, 0, 0), again expressed as an equivalent
variation of private-sector output. In the i.i.d. specification (Table 2, column seven),
the cost of business cycles is roughly equal in the status quo monetary union and in
the fiscal delegation scenarios, valued like a 0.13% permanent decrease in private sector
output. In the autocorrelated specification (Table 3), the welfare cost of business cycles
is 0.83% of output in the monetary union scenario, falling to 0.70% of output in scenario
Fj, and 0.71% of output in scenario F .
In summary, all our simulations show that the “austere” policies of the fiscal au-
thority are not very costly in intertemporal terms. Of course, we are not claiming
that fiscal delegation is a much better mechanism for smoothing shocks. Rather, what
we found initially surprising is the absence of a tradeoff between the long-run welfare
gains from lower debt and the short-run implications for countercyclical policy. By
eliminating much of the deficit bias associated with discretionary fiscal decisions, the
fiscal delegation regime achieves a large increase in long-run welfare, but it also slightly
reduces the losses associated with public demand shocks.
3.4 Games with debt as a residual
Thus far, our policy games have assumed that either the government or the fiscal
authority could unilaterally control time t debt issuance, and that public spending
would adjust as necessary to satisfy the budget constraint, given debt issuance and
tax revenues. While this assumption is not uncommon in macroeconomic models, it is
rather unrealistic. After all, standard budget procedures typically authorize spending
programs and set tax rates early in the fiscal year, issuing debt later in the budget cycle
as necessary to adjust for any unexpected imbalances between revenues and spending.
In such an environment, neither the government nor a hypothetical independent fiscal
authority has as much control over the debt as our results thus far have assumed.
Therefore, in this section, we investigate how our previous results are altered when
debt is a residual. Concretely, we now assume that expenditure, inflation, and taxes
are control variables of the players in our game, while debt is the residual variable that
adjusts to ensure that the budget constraint is satisfied in equilibrium.
3.4.1 Institutional scenarios
Scenario Md: Status quo model of a large monetary union, with debt as a residual
We start by looking at a large monetary union, with a single central bank that
chooses inflation πt for the whole union, while J regional governments Gj each choose
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regional taxes τjt and government expenditure gjt; djt is then given by the budget
constraint (5). Thus, the central bank’s choice set is ΘCt ≡ {πt, {dj,t}Jj=1}, and gov-
ernment j’s choice set is Θ
Gj
t ≡ {τjt, djt, gj,t}. As before, all policy makers act under
discretion. While previously the central bank recognized that high inflation implied
higher contempraneous output and public services, now it knows that raising inflation
raises output and lowers debt. This complicates its Euler equation, since it foresees
the impact of changing debt on other players’ choices in the next period:
απCπt + ν ¯ˆxt = βS
χd¯t−1 + κ
χd¯t + κ
Et
[
(απCπt+1 + ν ¯ˆxt+1)(R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt) +
+
(
1
ν
+
q2Lν
αgC
)
(απCπt+1 + (1 + χd¯t + κ)ν ¯ˆxt+1)
∂x¯t+1
∂dt
+
+(χd¯tαπCπt+1 − ν ¯ˆxt+1)∂πt+1
∂dt
]
. (46)
Next, consider the Euler equation that governs fiscal policy over time. The govern-
ment still trades off its impact on public and private spending according to (26). Also,
we continue to focus on the limit of a large monetary union (J = ∞) in which each
individual country is infinitesimal, so government j ignores all the spillovers from its
decisions. Then its Euler equation simplifies to
xˆj,t = βGR(d¯t)Etxˆj,t+1. (47)
Previously, to calculate the symmetric solution of scenario M , we solved for two
policy functions. Now, equilibrium can be characterized by three policy functions:
gross borrowing dt = B
Md(Ωt), inflation πt = I
Md(Ωt), and the output deviation
XˆMd(Ωt) ≡ xt − x˜. Using (6), we can write the budget constraint and the Euler
equations as follows:
BMd(Ωt) = (β
−1
S + δdt−1)dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(Et−1[I
Md(Ωt)]− IMd(Ωt)) +(
1
ν
+
q2Lν
αgC
)
XˆMd(Ωt)− κIMd(Ωt) + z˜t, (48)
XˆMd(Ωt) = βG
(
β−1S + δdt−1
)
EtXˆ
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1), (49)
βS
χdt−1 + κ
χBMd(Ωt) + κ
{[
απCI
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1) + νXˆ
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)
] (
β−1S + 2δB
Md(Ωt)
)
+
(
1
ν
+
q2Lν
αgC
)[
απCI
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1) + (1 + χB
Md(Ωt) + κ)νXˆ
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)
] ∂XˆMd
∂dt
(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)
+
[
χdtαπCI
Md(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)− νXˆMd(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)
] ∂IMd
∂dt
(BMd(Ωt), st, t+1)
}
.
(50)
απCI
Md(Ωt) + νXˆ
Md(Ωt) =
Finally, given BMd(Ωt),
Md(Ωt), and Xˆ
Md(Ωt), public spending calculated from (26).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1710
Scenario Fjd: Delegation of the tax rate to regional fiscal authorities, with debt as a
residual
Next, we consider the effect of delegating control of taxes to an independent regional
fiscal authority Fj, while regional governments choose public spending. As before, the
central bank controls union-wide inflation. Debt is treated as a residual by all policy
makers, so ΘCt ≡ {πt, {dj,t}Jj=1}, ΘGjt ≡ {gj,t, dj,t}, and ΘFjt ≡ {τjt, djt}. As in previous
policy games, we consider a symmetric equilibrium with many small countries.
The central bank’s decision problem is the same as in Scenario Md. But since taxes
and spending are now chosen by different policy makers, the linear equation (26) that
related output to public spending in previous scenarios no longer holds. Hence, the
central bank’s Euler equation is now given by
απCπt + ν ¯ˆxt = βS
χd¯t−1 + κ
χd¯t + κ
Et
[
(απCπt+1 + ν ¯ˆxt+1)(R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt) +
+(αgC ¯ˆgt+1(1 + χd¯t) + qL(απCπt+1 + ν ¯ˆxt+1))
∂ ¯ˆgt+1
∂dt
+
+
(
1
ν
)
(απCπt+1 + (1 + χd¯t + κ)ν ¯ˆxt+1)
∂ ¯ˆxt+1
∂dt
+
+(χd¯tαπCπt+1 − ν ¯ˆxt+1)∂πt+1
∂dt
]
. (51)
Next, the region-j government Euler equation can be simplified to
gˆj,t = βGEt
[
R(d¯t)gˆj,t+1 −
(
qL
αgG
xˆj,t+1 − 1
ν
gˆj,t+1
)
∂x¯t+1
∂dt
]
, (52)
and the regional fiscal authorities set taxes, or implicitly output, such that
νxˆj,t + αdFdj,t = βFEt
[
νxˆj,t+1R(d¯t) + (qLνxˆj,t+1 − αgGgˆj,t+1) ∂gj,t+1
∂dt
]
. (53)
The final equilibrium condition is given by the budget constraint. We must now solve
simultaneously for four policy functions: for the gross borrowing function, the inflation
function, and the output function, as in scenario Md, plus the policy function that
determines government expenditure, g¯t = G
Fjd(d¯t−1, s¯t−1, t).
Scenario Fd: Delegation of tax rates to a union-wide fiscal authority, with debt as a
residual
Finally, we consider delegating control of all regions’ taxes to a union-wide fiscal
authority, under the assumption that debt is a residual. The instrument allocation
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is ΘCt ≡ {πt, {dj,t}Jj=1}, ΘGjt ≡ {gj,t, dj,t}, and ΘFt ≡ {{τjt, djt}Jj=1}. As in scenario
Fjd, equilibrium is characterized by (51) for the central bank, and (52) and a budget
constraint for each regional government. Finally, (53) is replaced by an analogous
first-order condition for the union-wide fiscal authority:
ν ¯ˆxt + αdF d¯t = βFEt
[
ν ¯ˆxt+1(R(d¯t) +R
′(dt)dt)
+
(
qLν ¯ˆxt+1 − αgG ¯ˆgt+1
) ∂g¯t+1
∂dt
− (απFπt+1 + ν ¯ˆxt+1κ)∂πt+1
∂dt
]
. (54)
Here again we must solve for four policy functions simultaneously.
3.4.2 Results
The key messages from our previous analysis in which debt was a control variable
were (i) delegation of budget balance responsibilities to a national or union-wide fiscal
authority achieves a large reduction in debt, inflation, and tax burdens in steady state,
and thereby raises steady-state welfare and (ii) in response to a public demand shock,
the fiscal authority imposes greater austerity on impact than the status quo scenario
would imply, but the overall welfare cost of the shock is lower, because the presence of
the fiscal authority makes discretion less costly. Those conclusions remain true when
the control variable that may be delegated is taxes instead of debt. Figure 4 depicts the
policy functions; as before, fiscal authorities reduce debt and inflation relative to the
monetary union, but they do not allow as much smoothing of shocks (the borrowing
functions become flatter). As illustrated by Fig. 5, the inflation and debt responses
after a positive public spending shock are subdued by fiscal delegation, while output
falls more sharply. Again, the utility loss on impact is greater under a fiscal authority
than it is in the status quo monetary union, but the overall intertemporal welfare cost
of the shock is reduced by fiscal delegation, as we saw earlier in Fig. 3.
Nonetheless we see important differences when treating debt as a residual or as a
control variable. To highlight these differences, Fig. 4 displays the specifications with
debt as a residual and debt as a control in the same graph, comparing the policy func-
tions under the status quo (scenarios M and Md) and under regional fiscal delegation
(scenarios Fj and Fjd). Firstly, comparing scenarios M and Md, we see that if debt is
a residual (so that the central bank can directly affect the new quantity of debt) then
the inflationary bias resulting from lack of commitment increases substantially. The
welfare loss of the monetary union relative to the planner’s solution is therefore larger
in scenarioMd (21.2% of output, as seen in Table 4) than it was in scenarioM (19.4%).
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Figure 4: Borrowing and inflation. Comparing debt as a residual to debt as a control
Notes: Comparing policies across institutional scenarios, treating debt as a control or as a residual.
Left: Gross borrowing: debt dt as a function of dt−1.
Right: Inflation πt as a function of dt−1.
Black: Planner’s solution. Blue: Scenarios M (solid) and Md (dashed).
Magenta: Scenarios Fj (solid) and Fjd (dashed). Red stars: steady states.
Given the amplification of inflation bias, a regional FA with the same debt aversion is
now less effective in reducing steady state inflation and debt, so these lie further away
from their optimal levels (comparing scenarios Fj and Fjd to the planner’s solution,
which is again shown in black). Therefore the welfare level achieved by fiscal delegation
is further from that of the planner’s solution in scenarios Fjd and Fd than it was in
scenarios Fj and F . Nonetheless, as a slightly less effective solution to a more serious
problem, the welfare gains from establishing a fiscal authority in a monetary union are
larger when debt is a residual (varying between 18.8% and 19.9% of private output, in
the four specifications reported in Table 4) than they were in our previous calculations
with debt as a control.
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Table 4: Debt, inflation, and welfare in scenarios S where debt is a residual
Transition Crisis cost,b,c
Debta Inflation Welfareb gainb Crisis costb,c fixing debt Cyclical costb,d
dSss π
S
ss W
S
ss −WMss WS(dMss ,0,0)−WMss WS(dSss,0,	g0)−WSss WS(0,0,	g0)−WS(0,0,0) WSss−WSn (dSss,0,0)
Temporary shocks (autocorrelation 0)
Scenario P: Planner
0.1% 2.0% 21.2% +16.5% −0.39% −0.39% −0.12%
Scenario Md: status quo monetary union
199.9% 11.8% 0% 0% −0.49% −0.43% −0.14%
Scenario Fjd: Monetary union with regional fiscal authorities
36.4% 6.4% 18.8% +14.8% −0.40% −0.39% −0.12%
Scenario Fd: Monetary union with union-wide fiscal authority
15.5% 5.9% 19.7% +15.2% −0.39% −0.39% −0.13%
Correlated shocks (autocorrelation 0.7)
Scenario P: Planner
0.1% 2.0% +21.2% +16.6% −0.75% −0.75% −0.86%
Scenario Md: status quo monetary union
199.7% 11.8% 0% 0% −0.91% −0.83% −0.90%
Scenario Fjd: Monetary union with regional fiscal authorities
36.4% 6.4% +18.9% +14.9% −0.76% −0.75% −0.74%
Scenario Fd: Monetary union with union-wide fiscal authority
15.7% 5.9% +19.9% +15.4% −0.76% −0.75% −0.77%
aDebt expressed as a fraction of steady state private output of baseline scenario M .
bAll welfare changes stated as equivalent variations of private output, starting from nonstochastic steady state of baseline scenario M .
c“Crisis” refers to a four-percent rise in public goods demand at time 0, g0 = 0.02.
dComparing stochastic economy with gt ∼ N(0, 0.02) to nonstochastic economy (gt ≡ 0).
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As for the effects of a public demand shock, Figure 5 graphs the effects of a 4%
increase in the public spending bliss point g˜, with autocorrelation 0.7, under the as-
sumption that debt is a residual, comparing scenarios P , Md, Fjd, and Fd. This
is comparable to Fig. 3, which studied the same shock but assumed that debt was a
control variable. The biggest quantitative differences between the specifications with
debt as a residual and as a control are seen in the output and inflation responses. The
fiscal authority reduces output more sharply in response to the shock in Fig. 5, where
it controls the tax rate, than it did in Fig. 3, where it was assumed to control debt
directly. On the other hand, because inflation bias is worse when debt is a residual,
the rise in inflation associated with the monetary union scenario Md (the blue curve
in Fig. 5) is greater than it was in scenario M (the blue curve in Fig. 3). Summing the
countervailing effects on output and inflation over time, public demand shocks are less
costly under the fiscal delegation scenarios Fjd and Fd than they are in the monetary
union scenario Md, as Fig. 5 and Table 4 both show.
4 Policy implications
Fear of moral hazard continues to hold back agreement on possible mechanisms to
prevent self-fulfilling attacks on Eurozone states’ sovereign debt (such as Eurobonds)
and cross-border panics in the European banking system (such as a Single Deposit
Insurance Mechanism). The basic problem is that any mechanism capable of prevent-
ing crises opens the door to irresponsible fiscal policies that count on future bailouts
instead of maintaining long-run national budget balance. Thus, designing an institu-
tional framework capable of ensuring long-run fiscal discipline is a crucial counterpart
to the establishment of crisis prevention mechanisms, so an adequate fiscal framework
could prove to be the key to the long-run stability of the Eurozone.
An independent fiscal authority for EMU
Our model points to a potentially powerful recipe for fiscal discipline: the establishment
of a budgetary agency within the European Commission, mandated to ensure long-run
budget balance, which for the sake of concreteness we will call the European Fiscal
Authority (EFA). What exactly would the EFA do? First, it would necessarily take
the form of a forecasting agency, monitoring and predicting fiscal trends in each member
state. Second, it could provide advice to member governments about the likely fiscal
impact of new policy proposals. These are tasks it would share with the national fiscal
councils that have been established in compliance with the “Fiscal Compact” treaty
(European Council, 2012).
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Figure 5: Autocorrelated public demand shock. Comparing scenarios when debt is a residual.
Notes: Impulse responses of debt, inflation, government spending, output, and instantaneous and
cumulated utility to a 4% increase in the public spending bliss point g˜ (autocorrelation ρ = 0.7),
assuming debt is a residual.
Indeed, the “Five Presidents’ Report” (J. Juncker et al., 2015) has led to the cre-
ation of a similar monitoring council at the EU level. The new European Fiscal Board
will begin work in 2017, with a small staff and a mandate explicitly limited to moni-
toring and advice (European Commission, 19 October 2016). Nonetheless, if member
state governments wish it, this institutional seed could grow into something larger,
with expanded powers. Our concept of the EFA would go further, exercising execu-
tive control over one or more national fiscal instruments delegated to it by member
states. Importantly, these would have to be instruments with a sufficiently strong bud-
getary impact to give it effective control over the path of each member state’s public
debt. Our model suggests that by correcting biases caused by lack of commitment,
this setup would decrease debt accumulation, and might decrease the cost of economic
fluctuations even if it means that some shocks have sharper effects on impact.
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In our model, all policy decisions are equilibrium outcomes of games between policy
makers with different instruments and preferences, representing different institutional
designs. Thus, our analysis is founded on the assumption that no policy makers can
truly commit to follow a rule, treating fiscal and monetary policies in a consistent way.27
Considering how pliable European fiscal rules have proved in practice, a model based
on discretion seems more informative than one based on commitment. But beyond
its role as a modeling device, we would also argue that granting discretion to fiscally
“conservative” institutions (in the sense of Rogoff, 1985) is a more realistic path for
Europe today than forever trying to make rules more binding. Just as independent
central banks may consider multiple short-run objectives while stabilizing inflation in
the long run, the EFA could take many short-run factors into account while nudging
its fiscal instrument(s) in the right direction to control debt in the long run. We em-
phasize long-run budget balance because avoiding permanent unidirectional transfers
is essential to maintaining a long-run voluntary relationship between sovereign states.
This contrasts with the emphasis on uniform short-run deficit rules originally embodied
in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which have little justification in economic theory.
Likewise, we focus on strengthening the credibility of long-run budget balance rather
than centralizing fiscal decisions because the former seems a more realistic path for
Europe. Restricting the mandate of the EFA to fiscal sustainability leaves most fiscal
policy-making at the local level. Creating a federal government would instead centralize
fiscal policy, losing local information and hence decreasing the efficiency of spending.
Likewise, the decisions of a distant federal government might be perceived as less le-
gitimate and democratic. In this way, an unelected European body charged only with
ensuring long-run budget balance might actually produce a more democratic outcome
than would an elected European government with wider fiscal powers.
A credible quid pro quo
If we accept that this form of fiscal discipline is indeed beneficial, and compatible with
democracy, several further questions arise. First, is it politically feasible? Second,
can effective fiscal instruments be established, in practice? And finally, which fiscal
instrument(s) would be most appropriate for delegation to a hypothetical European
Fiscal Agency?
27In our model, there is no equilibrium role for rules. An interesting extension would be a stochastic
model of “sustainable equilibria”, which might allow us to incorporate rules and punishments as
equilibrium outcomes, along the lines of Chari and Kehoe (1990). See Basso (2009) for an analysis of
monetary delegation in a sustainable equilibrium model.
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Although delegation of fiscal instruments is not standard practice today, it does
seem politically feasible in the European context. Fiscally fragile countries in the Eu-
rozone still need backing from the monetary authorities in order to avoid the risk of
speculative attacks and banking panics, which the ECB is able to provide. However,
fiscally strong European countries oppose monetary protection against speculative at-
tacks, because they fear moral hazard: the weaker countries might fail to balance their
budgets if they take ECB protection for granted.
These considerations point to a politically feasible quid pro quo. Let us suppose
that the mandate of the European Fiscal Board is expanded beyond an advisory role,
to ensuring long-run fiscal sustainability of member states by appropriately setting
the fiscal instruments that those member states choose to delegate to it. We will call
this hypothetical, more powerful agency the EFA. The first task of the EFA would
be to evaluate whether the instruments proposed for delegation by any given member
state are powerful enough and agile enough to give it effective control of that member
state’s debt. Once the EFA judges that it has been granted effective control of a
given member state’s debt level— including setting up the legal and administrative
framework for control of the proposed instruments by the EFA— then that member
state would become immediately eligible for ECB protection against speculative attacks
(by whatever mechanism the ECB judges appropriate).
Crucially, protection would remain contingent at all times on continuing approval
from the EFA. If at any time the EFA judges that its delegated instruments are less
powerful than expected, or if it judges that a member state has begun to “game the
system” in some way that makes it unable to control that state’s debt level, the EFA
would publicly revoke its approval of the delegated instruments (probably, but not nec-
essarily, after adequate advance warning to the member state). The ECB would then
be obliged to cease backing that state’s sovereign debt. One might question whether
it is credible to threaten to eliminate a member state’s protection against speculative
attacks. There could be scope for moral hazard if eliminating protection of the bonds
of one country caused contagion to others. But as long as the other fiscally fragile
countries are themselves participating in the EFA system, scope for contagion would
be greatly mitigated.
Which instruments to delegate?
Finally, we come to the question of which instrument(s), if any, would be appropriate
for delegating control of long-term budget balance to the European Commission. Our
paper has modeled instrument delegation in two ways. The simpler assumption is that
the fiscal authority actually issues each member state’s sovereign debt; the member
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government is then free to spend the cash proceeds.28 We show that delegation of debt
issuance is very effective in reducing biases generated in a monetary union, theoretically
being the preferred option.
However, most forms of public spending involve long-term projects and long-term
contracts that are hard to adjust rapidly; therefore, in practice, most public spending
is planned long in advance, and sovereign debt issuance is typically a residual, chosen
after spending and taxes to compensate any difference between the two. Indeed, formal
control of debt issuance may not suffice for de facto control of the debt.29 The de facto
debt level may be affected by hidden securitization of future public revenues, by off-
balance sheet exposures (unfunded pensions, guarantees given to social security or
other state entities), or even by more explicit measures such as the issuance of scrip,
“platinum coins” (an instrument recently discussed in the US) or IOUs— or simply
delaying payments. These measures have in fact have been used quite frequently by
countries unable to formally issue more sovereign debt. Hence the second version of
our model assumes the fiscal authority controls taxes, instead of debt issuance per se.
While delegation is somewhat less effective in this case, it still significantly reduces
debt biases without imposing further constraints on stabilization.
An EFA could be granted control over taxes or government expenditure in a wide
variety of ways. In the case of taxes, probably the simplest idea is that of Gruen
(1997), who proposed defining a multiplicative shift factor in the Australian tax code.
He proposed applying this shift factor to income taxes, VAT taxes, and all other types
of taxes. Tax rates would take whatever complicated functional form the Australian
government chose, but would subsequently by multiplied by a factor Xt, which would
initially be set to one but would thereafter be adjusted by an independent fiscal au-
thority to ensure control of the debt level.
As for controlling government expenditure, Gomes (2011) argues that public sector
wages should optimally be state-contingent, rising in times of fiscal plenty and falling
when the budget is tight. Adjustments of this type would have a powerful budgetary
impact, and could in principle be performed very quickly, particularly if a shift factor
28When instead the authority is decreasing the debt stock in nominal terms, the implicit assumption
is that the fiscal authority is the first claimant on all period t tax revenues of region j until it achieves
its desired debt level dj,t.
29A number of proposals, including Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen (1999), Wyplosz (2005),
and Maskin (September 29, 2016), have advocated delegating the choice of a deficit limit, annually,
to an independent fiscal authority. But this is better understood as delegating the choice of a target,
rather than delegating an instrument. So this regime does not correspond to either version of our
model; instead, it is a game which requires discretionary action by the government, in a second stage,
after the deficit limit is set, and therefore the debt level is not a control variable of the fiscal authority.
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were spelled out explicitly ex ante in public contracts, instead of being an ad hoc crisis
response, as was the case in Spain and Portugal during the crisis. Additional adjust-
ment factors related to long-term budget trends offer another potentially powerful lever
that could be delegated to an independent fiscal authority. For example, in a recent
pension reform, the Spanish government established a “Factor de Revalorizacio´n An-
ual” that will be automatically adjust pensions each year in response to any persistent
deficits or surpluses in the pension system; see Sa´nchez (2014). However, any spending
adjustment that affects only part of the government budget could imply large distribu-
tional consequences across different groups in the population. Therefore, Costain and
de Blas (2012a,b), go a step further and point out that all public sector prices could be
made effectively state-contingent by budgeting them in an alternative unit of account,
the value of which could be determined by a fiscal authority.
Whether or not to participate in the EFA mechanism, and if so, which instrument(s)
to delegate to the fiscal authority, is ultimately a political decision that should be
taken democratically in each member state. But from the point of view of the political
quid pro quo between member states, the only essential question is whether a given
instrument has a sufficient budgetary impact to enable the EFA to adequately control
long-run debt. The only decision in the hands of the fiscal authority itself would be
the technical and quantitative question of what setting of its delegated instrument is
consistent with long-run budget balance under its forecasts, given the policies of the
member government.30 All other fiscal instruments would remain under the control of
the member government, consistent with the European principal of “subsidiarity”.
5 Conclusions
Motivated by the failure of fiscal rules to avoid deficit bias in Europe, this paper has
analyzed an alternative policy regime in which each member state government delegates
at least one fiscal instrument to an independent authority with a mandate to avoid
excessive debt. Other fiscal decisions remain in the hands of member governments,
including the allocation of spending across different public goods, and the composition
of taxation.
We have compared long run debt accumulation and the response to public spend-
ing shocks in dynamic games representing several different institutional configurations,
30Since debt rather than deficits per se is the relevant issue for intertemporal budget balance, deficits
may fluctuate substantially even when they are controlled by the EFA. There may even be circum-
stances when a short-run deficit favors long-run budget balance, for example if a temporary deficit
enables productive investments, or if the economy appears to be temporarily beyond the maximum of
its Laffer curve.
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including a status quo monetary union scenario with many local governments, a mon-
etary union with a single federal government, and various fiscal delegation scenarios,
as well as a social planner’s solution. We made two simple assumptions to discipline
our treatment of different types of institutions: first, that elected institutions are rela-
tively impatient, and second, that an institution mandated to achieve a simple, feasible,
quantitative goal will value that goal more strongly than the rest of the society does.
In our numerical simulations, delegation of budget balance responsibilities to a
national or union-wide fiscal authority reduces debt, inflation, and tax burdens in
steady state, and thereby raises steady-state welfare, compared with the status quo
scenario. The welfare gains are large in our model, and it is plausible to suppose that
they could be large in practice too, because they are driven primarily by the fact that
a large change in steady-state debt implies a large reduction in the interest burden
on public debt, and hence on the burden of tax distortions. These conclusions hold
regardless of whether the fiscal authority chooses debt directly, or whether it instead
chooses the tax rate, implying that debt is determined as a budget residual.
In response to a public spending shock, the fiscal authority imposes greater auster-
ity on impact than the status quo scenario would imply. Nonetheless, we find that the
overall welfare cost of the shock is lower under the fiscal authority, because its presence
makes lack of commitment less costly, so that paying back the initial debt increase is
much less distortionary. Similarly, the transition path when a fiscal authority is estab-
lished imposes substantial austerity as the high initial debt is paid down. Nonetheless,
the long-run welfare gains are so large that establishing a fiscal authority is preferred,
from an ex ante social welfare perspective, even when the economy starts at the high
steady-state debt level of the monetary union.
Going beyond the model, Section 4 discussed the role that fiscal delegation might
play in Eurozone reform, where a disciplined fiscal regime is a crucial counterpart (both
economically and politically) to most of the monetary and financial mechanisms cur-
rently under consideration to stabilize European economies and financial markets. A
European Fiscal Authority controlling at least one sufficiently powerful fiscal instru-
ment in a member state could guarantee that state’s long-run budget balance. The
member state itself would decide which instrument to delegate, while the EFA would
evaluate whether it is “sufficiently powerful”. Delegation to the EFA would be attrac-
tive if it made member states eligible for ECB protection against speculative attacks;
but even without such a guarantee it could be attractive as a way of improving fiscal
credibility and lowering risk premia. Therefore we have stressed that these institutions
could be constructed in a voluntary, step-by-step fashion. As long as fears of moral haz-
ard persist, peripheral countries can do little to achieve a union-wide agreement that
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would protect them against any future shocks to the Eurozone. Reforming their fiscal
institutions— possibly unilaterally— is one way peripheral countries could jumpstart
the negotiations for such an agreement.
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A Appendix: Deriving the Euler equations and com-
puting equilibrium
For each institution scenario considered, we construct a equilibrium in terms of the
state variables Ωt ≡ (dt−1, st−1,t). To calculate the first-order conditions we must
initially allow for off-equilibrium deviations that would result in asymmetric states,
but ultimately we assume shocks are symmetric and solve for the resulting symmetric
equilibrium in terms of the reduced state Ωt ≡ (dt−1, st−1, t). In this appendix, we
derive the functional equations that define the equilibrium policies for scenario M , and
then explain how we solve them. Our methodology is similar for other scenarios.
Scenario M treats debt, taxes, and inflation as controls, and public spending as a
residual. Thus, when we apply the generic decision problems (16)-(17) to scenario M ,
gj,t shows up in both the choice sets Θ
C
t and Θ
Gj
t :
Central bank: ΘCt = {πt, {gj,t}Jj=1}
V C(Ωt) =
max
ΘCt
−1
2
⎧⎨
⎩απCπ2t + 1J
J∑
j=1
⎡
⎣(xj,t + ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜)2 + αgC (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βCEtV
C(Ωt+1) +
1
J
J∑
j=1
ΛCj,t
[
dj,t −
(
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ(πet − πt)
)
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt − qLgj,t
]
. (55)
Regional government: ΘGjt = {dj,t, τj,t, gj,t}
V Gj(Ωt) =
max
ΘGjt
−1
2
⎧⎨
⎩απGπ2t + (xj,t + ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜)2 + αgG (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βGEtV
Gj(Ωt+1) + Λ
Gj
t
[
dj,t −
(
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ(πet − πt)
)
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt − qLgj,t
]
. (56)
In equilibrium, each policy maker knows the strategies played by the others. To
make this explicit, we can write the decision problems showing that the variables not
chosen by C are instead given by Gj’s policy function, and vice versa. Hence, we define
Π(Ωt) as the central bank’s inflation function, and Tj(Ωt) as the tax policy function of
government Gj.
To write the Bellman equations precisely, we also write the gross borrowing function
of Gj as Bj(Ωt), and we define the list of all country-specific borrowing functions,
B(Ωt) ≡ (B1(Ωt), B2(Ωt), . . . BJ(Ωt)).
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But also, to allow for deviations from the policy function by country j, we define the
list B−j(Ωt) which is identical to B(Ωt), except that it contains an arbitrary borrowing
choice dj,t in position j:
B−j(Ωt) ≡ (B1(Ωt), . . . , dj,t, . . . BJ(Ωt)).
Then the Bellman equations can be rewritten as follows.
Central bank: ΘCt = {πt, {gj,t}Jj=1}
V C(Ωt) =
max
ΘCt
−1
2
⎧⎨
⎩απCπ2t + 1J
J∑
j=1
⎡
⎣(xj,t + ν (πt − Et−1Π(Ωt)− Tj(Ωt))− x˜)2 + αgC (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βCEtV
C
(
B(Ωt), st,t+1
)
+
1
J
J∑
j=1
ΛCj,t
{
Bj(Ωt)−
[
R (dt−1) + χ
(
Et−1Π(Ωt)− πt
)]
dj,t−1 + Tj(Ω) + κπt − qLgj,t
}
.
(57)
Notice that the effects of surprise inflation are calculated relative to rational expecta-
tions formed at time t− 1.
Regional government: ΘGjt = {dj,t, τj,t, gj,t}
V Gjt (Ωt) =
max
ΘGjt
−1
2
⎧⎨
⎩απGΠ(Ωt)2 +
(
xj,t + ν
(
Π(Ωt)− Et−1Π(Ωt)− τj,t
)
− x˜
)2
+ αgG (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
⎫⎬
⎭
+ βGEtV
Gj
t+1
(
B−j(Ωt), st,t+1
)
+ ΛGjt
{
dj,t −
[
R
(
d¯t−1
)
+ χ
(
Et−1Π(Ωt)−Π(Ωt)
)]
dj,t−1 + τj,t + κΠ(Ωt)− qLgj,t
}
.
(58)
The first-order conditions are easily seen to be
0 = − απCπt − 1
J
∑
j
ν(xj,t − x˜) + 1
J
∑
j
ΛCj,t(χdj,t−1 + κ), (59)
0 = − αgC(gj,t − g˜j,t)− ΛCj,tqL, (60)
0 = βGEt
∂V Gjt+1
∂dj,t
+ ΛGjt , (61)
0 = ν(xj,t − x˜) + ΛGjt , (62)
0 = − αgG(gj,t − g˜j,t)− ΛGjt qL. (63)
Now, to derive a system of difference equations, we will need to eliminate
∂V Gjt+1
∂dj,t
. The
envelope theorem implies that we can ignore all of government Gj’s own choice variables
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when calculating
∂V Gjt
∂dj,t−1
, but we cannot ignore the impact of dj,t−1 on other players’
choices. Thus we obtain
∂V Gjt
∂dj,t−1
= − ΛGjt
(
R(d¯t−1) + χ(Et−1Π(Ωt)− Π(Ωt)) + 1
J
R′(d¯t−1)dj,t−1
)
−
{
απGΠ(Ωt)− κΛGjt
} ∂Π
∂dj,t−1
−
{
ν(xj,t − x˜)− χΛGjt dj,t−1
}( ∂Π
∂dj,t−1
− Et−1 ∂Π
∂dj,t−1
)
+ βG
∑
k =j
Et
∂V Gjt+1
∂dk,t
∂Bk
∂dj,t−1
. (64)
Taking expectations, the surprise inflation terms drop out. Therefore, (61) becomes
ΛGjt = βGEt
⎧⎨
⎩ΛGjt+1
(
R(d¯t) +
1
J
R′(d¯t)dj,t
)
+
{
απGΠ(B(Ωt), st,t+1)− κΛGjt+1
} ∂Π
∂dj,t
− βG
∑
k =j
Et
∂V Gjt+2
∂dk,t+1
∂Bk
∂dj,t
⎫⎬
⎭ .
(65)
In general, to evaluate this equation we would need to take another envelope condition
in order to eliminate the derivative
∂V Gjt+2
∂dk,t+1
. However, note that the factors ∂Π
∂dj,t
,
∂V Gjt+2
∂dk,t+1
and ∂Bk
∂dj,t
all scale proportionally to 1
J
, while the summation operator in (65) scales
proportionally to J . Therefore, in the limit as J → ∞, (65) reduces to
ΛGjt = βGR(B¯(Ωt))EtΛ
Gj
t+1, (66)
because all the other terms in the equation are of order 1
J
. From here, simple algebra
leads to equations (28) and (30). Next, we restrict our calculations to the case of
symmetric shocks (j,t = t for all j), in which case the state of the economy can
be reduced from Ωt = (dt−1, st−1,t) to the scalar triple Ωt = (dt−1, st−1, t). We
therefore search for a symmetric solution, Bj(Ω) = B(Ω) for all j, which must satisfy
the following functional equations:
BM(Ωt) = R (dt−1) dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)
[
Et−1[IM(Ωt)]− IM(Ωt)
]− κ˘I˘M(Ωt) + z˜t,
(67)
I˘M(Ωt) = βS
(
β−1S + δB
M(Ωt)
)
EtI˘
M(BM(Ωt), st, t+1). (68)
We approximate the functions B(Ω) and I˘(Ω) with Chebyshev polynomials, and evalu-
ate the integral in (68) by Gauss-Hermite quadrature. We solve the model by searching
for Chebyshev coefficients such that (67)-(68) hold with sufficient accuracy.
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A.1 Planner’s problem
Since the planner can commit, it can be viewed as choosing a plan, contingent on t, for
each time t choice variable, including πt. Unlike the other environments, the equation
πet = Etπt not only holds as an equilibrium relation, but also enters as a constraint on
the planner’s problem. We will call the multiplier on this constraint λt. This multiplier
constrains the problem prior to the realization of t, so in the planner’s solution it is
given by a function λt = λ(dt−1, st−1) which does not depend on t.
Solving problem (22), the following conditions must hold for any realization of the
shocks t:
0 = − απSπt − 1
J
∑
νxˆj,t +
1
J
ΛPj,t(χdj,t−1 + κ)− λt (69)
0 = − αgS gˆj,t − ΛPj,tqL (70)
0 = βSEt
∂V Pt+1
∂dj,t
+
1
J
ΛPj,t (71)
0 = νxˆj,t + Λ
P
j,t (72)
dj,t = (R(d¯t−1) + χ(πet − πt))dj,t−1 + qLgj,t − τj,t − κπt (73)
πet = Et−1πt (74)
∂V Pt
∂dj,t−1
= − 1
J
ΛPj,t
(
R( ¯dt−1) + χ(πet − πt)
)− 1
J2
∑
k
R′(d¯t−1)dk,t−1ΛPk,t. (75)
By committing to πt as a function of t, the planner is also committing (at t− 1) to an
expected inflation rate πet = Et−1πt. The first-order condition for π
e
t is
0 = λt + Et−1
1
J
∑
j
(
νxˆj,t − χΛPj,tdj,t−1
)
gˆj,t. (76)
Simplifying, we see the usual intertemporal relation between xˆ and gˆ:
νxˆj,t =
αgS
qL
gˆj,t. (77)
Imposing symmetry to eliminate a covariance term, we can solve for λt:
31
λt = −(1 + χdt−1)αgS
qL
gˆet , (78)
where gˆet ≡ Et−1gˆt. Likewise, a symmetric equilibrium implies an Euler equation for
aggregate public spending:
gˆt = βS (R(dt) +R
′(dt)dt)Etgˆt+1. (79)
31For comparability with our policy games, which were solved under the assumption of symmetric
shocks to all regions at all times, we likewise solve the planner’s solution under a symmetric scenario.
Therefore the planner’s policies depend on the ordered triple Ωt.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1710
In contrast, there is no longer an analogous Euler equation for inflation, because
πt is shifted by the multiplier λt. Assuming symmetry, the first-order condition for
inflation is
−απSπt = αgS
qL
(1 + κ+ χdt−1)gˆt + λt =
καgS
qL
gˆt + (1 + χdt−1)
αgS
qL
(gˆt − gˆet ) . (80)
Note that λt is positive, and hence lowers the inflation rate πt chosen by the planner.
The inflation condition (80) can also be written as a relation between surprise inflation
and surprise public spending:
−απS (πt − πet ) =
αgS
qL
(1 + κ+ χdt−1) (gˆt − gˆet ) (81)
The budget constraint for aggregate debt can be written as
dt = (R(dt−1 + χ(πet − πt))) dt−1 + (πet − πt) + q∗gˆt −
καgS
qLαπS
(1 + χdt−1)gˆet + z˜, (82)
where
q∗ = qL +
αgS
qL
(
1
ν2
+
κ
απS
(1 + κ+ χdt−1)
)
. (83)
We now have three equations, (79), (80), and (82), to solve for the three policy
functions Gˆ(Ω), B(Ωt), and Π(Ωt). Alternatively, we can eliminate inflation from the
budget constraint using (81):
dt = R(dt−1)dt−1 + (1 + χdt−1)(πet − πt) + q∗gˆt −
καgS
qLαπS
(1 + χdt−1)gˆet + z˜t
= R(dt−1)dt−1 − αgS
qLαπS
(1 + χdt−1)(1 + κ+ χdt−1) (gˆt − gˆet ) + q∗gˆt −
καgS
qLαπS
(1 + χdt−1)gˆet + z˜t
= R(dt−1)dt−1 +
(
qL +
αgS
ν2qL
)
gˆt +
κ2αgS
qLαπS
gˆet +
αgS
qLαπS
(κ2 − (1 + χdt−1)2) (gˆt − gˆet ) + z˜t.
(84)
Now (79) and (84) suffice to determine the planner’s policies Gˆ(Ωt) and B(Ωt). The
relevant functional equations are:32
Gˆ(Ωt) = βS
(
β−1S + 2δB(Ωt)
)
EtGˆ(B(Ωt), st, t+1), (85)
B(Ωt) = R(dt−1)dt−1 +
(
qL +
αgS
ν2qL
)
Gˆ(Ωt) +
κ2αgS
qLαπS
Et−1Gˆ(Ωt)
+
αgS
qLαπS
(κ2 − (1 + χdt−1)2)
(
Gˆ(Ωt)− Et−1Gˆ(Ωt)
)
+ z˜t. (86)
32A non-stochastic version of these two equations can be solved first, to find non-stochastic policy
functions Gˆt(dt−1, st−1) and Bt(dt−1, st−1), which can then be used as an initial guess for solving the
stochastic equations (79) and (84).
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